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The Arab world is confronted with an increasing pressure coming from the supply side of the 
labor  market,  generated  principally  by  the  unemployed  persons  looking  for  a  job,  the  new 
entrants on the labor market and the expected increase of the women labor force participation 
rate.  This  pressure  is  compounded  by  structural  considerations  relating  to  the  slow  labor 
productivity growth, low demand for skills, slow and erratic domestic investment growth, low 
attractiveness  of  foreign  direct  investment  and  high  dependency  on  the  dynamics  of  the 
international oil market as well as labor migration. This working paper examines the main trends 
in the Arab labor market affecting both supply and demand of the labor force, and presents an 
overall assessment of the active labor market programs adopted in some Arab countries. It also 
presents some programs and policies aiming to enhance employment opportunities of Arab youth. 
   
تيبشعنا تقطنلما في تناطبنا تهكشي في شظننا ةداعإ  
صخهي  
هجاىت    لوذنا ىظعي تيبشعنا    ثاطىغظ ٍي ةذيازتي   في ضشعنا بَاج   قىس    تجيتنك مًعنا ن يهعفنا عفتشلما ٌوزخًهن  ينهطاعه
  مننًعنا ٍنع      ابننشنا  ىنصلخاب و نو ،    دذنندا ينهلاذنه قىننس في     منًعنا    تنعةىتلما ةداننيزهنو ، في   لذننعي      ة شننلما تكسانشي ةىننة في  
نا مًع .   ذيزي اممو    ،طغعنا ازه ىةافت ٍي   بنَاج ٍي       ،تنيهكييا ثاسانبتعلاا      طنب     ىننم       منًعنا تنيجاتَإ      بنهطنا ضانفنخاو ،
ثاساهلما ًهع   طبو ، و  واظتَا وذع ىنم   و ،يهلمحا ساًثتسلاا دا ضافنخا تيبرا   ساًثتسلان   و ششابلما بينجلأا     بنكنا داًتعلاا
   ًنهع   تنكشلمحا يىننقنا   طفننننا قىننسن   وذنا   ،تنين     ٍنع لاننعف     تنهياعنا ذننينا ةشننجه .  نا  زننه صننصتخ   تننساسذن تنةسى    ثاننهاتجلاا
تيسيئشنا   قاىس  في   مًعنا   تيبشعنا    و ًهع شثؤت تينا   ٍي مك       ًنهع بنهطناو ضشعنا       ،تنهياعنا يىنقنا          تنةسىنا وذنقت انًك    انًييقت
  نن اعيشس   جيابر     منًعنا قاىنس     تطنشننا       في ثذنًتعا تيننا         تنيبشعنا لوذننا طنعب         ىنصلخاب تنفداياو لىإ         منًعنا  شنف زنيزعت  
هن  ابش .  
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1. Introduction 
Over  the  last  four  decades,  most  Arab  countries  have  embarked  on  economic  reform  programs 
with the aim of reducing the budget deficits and achieving macroeconomic stability. As a result, 
inflation rates have fallen significantly in the period from 1995 to 1998 compared with the period 
from 1985 to 1994. However, the growth rate of GDP per capita in the 1990s, increased at an 
average  of  no  more  than  1%  per  year,  and  the  relatively  low  savings  rates  in  the  region  were 
accompanied by an insignificant increase of the average investment rate by 1.1% in the 1990’s. It 
became  apparent  that  none  of  the  Arab  non-oil  economies  had  succeeded  in  utilizing  the 
economic  boom  of  the  oil  decade  1973-1982  significantly  to  increase  the  number  of  real 
employment  opportunities  through  economic  diversification,  particularly  through  industrial  and 
agricultural development. Thus, for most of the Arab (oil and non-oil) economies, the oil boom 
created some strong ripple effects. 
The combination of economic recession and at least stagnation in the number of Arab workers in 
the Arab oil countries during the 80s of the last century, in parallel to the continuing rapid growth 
of the workforces, led to a sharp increase in unemployment in the Arab non-oil economies. Hence 
after  four  decades  of  economic  adjustment,  Arab  countries  face  two-digit  unemployment  rates 
that  are  higher  than  all  other  regions  of  the  world.  Although  it  is  difficult  to  compute  precise 
estimates of the unemployment rates in this region of the world, recent calculations put this rate 
at between 10-15% in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia and at 16-20 
% in Libya, Sudan and Yemen, and more than 30% in Mauritania and Somalia
1.  
Youth unemployment reflects the level of economic activity in general as well as the trends in the 
demand on labor in the labor market. In the Arab region, where at least 20 percent of the total 
population is between 15 and 24 years, each year over 500,000 enter the labor market, t he vast 
majority are in the age cohort of 15 -24. However,  youth unemployment rates in this region are 
much higher than adult unemployment rates, averaging 27.3 % in 2007 . It accounts for 54.2% of 
total unemployment (more than 70% of unemployment in Jordan, Mauritania, Yemen as well as 
Egypt) and is considered as the highest in the world (ahead the poorest region in the world, Sub -
Saharan Africa which has the second highest rate of youth unemployment 21%)
2.  
Moreover, most unemployed are educated. The ratio  of secondary and tertiary graduated in total 
unemployed is over 51% in Tunisia, 44% in Morocco and 34% in Algeria
3. These figures are a 
source  of  concern  not  only  for  economic  reasons,  but  also  because  of  their  socio -political 
implications especially in autocratic societies. Indeed, experiencing unemployment at lower ages 
might have not  only a negative  and permanent  impact in hampering  young people’s  productive 
potentials and future employment  opportunities, but can also  lead to marginalization,  exclusion, 
frustration, low self-esteem and, sometimes, to acts that impact negatively on society and destroy 
the social structure. 
                                                   
1  Key indicators, aggregated tables of the eighth issue of Circular of labor statistics in the Arab countries, Arab 
Labor Organization:  
http://www.alolabor.org/nArabLabor/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=15&id=85&
Itemid=64 
2 Arab Labor Organization estimates based on official Arab statistical sources (imgration-2010.xls): 
http://www.alolabor.org/nArabLabor//index.php?option=content&task=view&id=472 
3 KILM Sixth Edition, April 2010, ILO.   3 
In a  number of  Arab  countries the  unemployment problem  is  also largely  a problem  of  female 
unemployment. The participation of women in the Arab labor market has undoubtedly increased 
progressively  over  past  decades,  and  indicators  related  to  the  involvement  of  women  in  the 
economy  continue  to  point  upwards.  However,  these  quantitative  improvements  mask  persistent 
qualitative disparities with regard to the status of women and men at work. Indeed, in the Arab 
region  there  is  an  increasing  tendency  towards  the  feminization  of  unemployment.  Female 
unemployment rate of 16.5% was 5.9% points higher than the male rate of 10.6 % in 2003 in 
Arab region. Unemployed  women are mainly  young new  labor force entrants  with primary  and 
secondary education, and laid off workers following restructuring and privatization particularly in 
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. 
Over  the  years,  several  explanations  have  been  proposed  for  poor  performance  of  employment 
and  the  consequent  development  of  the  high  unemployment  rates  above  all  among  educated 
youth in the region.  
One of the most influential is the skills mismatch hypothesis. In many Arab countries, there is a 
widespread belief that workers’ skills and education are not adequate for the demands of jobs in 
the  current  economy.  Journalistic  reports,  popular,  academic  and  policy  recurrent  debates  on 
school quality  and  education  reform all  suggest  a  mismatch between  the  skills  workers  possess 
and what jobs require, what economists call an imbalance between the supply of and demand for 
human capital  or  the  skills  mismatch  hypothesis.  Many  believe  that  the  problems  will  become 
even  more  serious  because  the  pace  of  change  is  accelerating  and  the  workplace  is  becoming 
increasingly  high  tech,  service-oriented,  and  reorganized  to  involve  greater  employee 
participation in the workplace.  
According to this explanation, the education system in many Arab countries produces skills that 
are  not  valued  by  employers,  while  raising  the  expectations  of  those  who  acquire  them.  As  a 
result,  the  unemployed  are  not  interested  by  the  existing  vacancies,  whereas  the  employers  are 
not  willing  to  fill  them  with  the  available  candidates.  The  mismatch  is  considered  to  be 
particularly severe  for  those who  are  just coming  out  of school,  and  have no  work  experience. 
The practical remedy to the unemployment problem, if the skills mismatch hypothesis is correct, 
is  to  reform  the  education  system  and  to  supplement  it  with  vocational  training  geared  to  the 
needs of  the  labor  market.  Vocational  training  programs  of  this  sort  are  supposed  to  make  the 
unemployed more employable. 
A second explanation focuses on public sector employment and pay policies. In many countries, 
public  sector  jobs  are  characterized  by  more  stability,  higher  benefits,  lower  effort  and  more 
prestige  than  their  private  sector  counterparts.  In  almost  all  Arab  countries,  they  are  also 
characterized by higher pay. Labor market entrants thus face an incentive to wait for job openings 
in the public sector. Some of them would rather remain inactive than take the available jobs out 
of the public sector.  
Based on this second explanation, a credible reform of public sector recruitment and pay policies 
would  be  the  most  effective  way  to  reduce  unemployment,  because  it  would  discourage  the 
queuing attitude.   4 
Finally, a  third explanation  emphasizes the  lack  of sufficient  employment opportunities  in  the 
Arab private sector, characterized by lack of entrepreneurship culture and high degree of aversion 
to  risk.  Private  investment,  generally  focused  on  protected  domestic  markets,  remains 
compressed  at  levels  below  potential  and  is  losing  dynamism  in  the  Arab  region.  It's  both 
insufficient and inefficient.  
One of the main reasons for investment insufficiency is that savings are not properly  channeled 
by  the  financial  sector  (dominated  by  the  banking  system)  to  productive  projects.  The  lack  of 
liquid investments in the Arab region has a direct negative effect on productive investment in the 
region, as it makes it difficult for entrepreneurs to raise capital to finance their potentially good 
ideas. The low levels of development of capital forces potential real investors into the hands  of 
the  banking  system,  which  has  become  immensely  powerful,  both  economically  and  politically. 
Despite their domination of the financial sector, banks are not efficient enough to play the critical 
role that they must in the process of economic growth and development. As a result, the ratio of 
private investment to public investment is unusually low; for the Arab region as a whole, the ratio 
is close to 2 (slightly larger  for non-oil economies). It remains  well below the levels of  OECD 
economies (ratios close to 6) or that of the East Asian economies (ratios close to 5). 
Another  source  of  lack  of  employment  generation  in  the  Arab  world  is  the  region's  reduced 
overall  economic  efficiency.  Total  factor  productivity  levels  for  a  sample  of  Arab  countries 
between 1975 and 2000 are very low. With the exception of some Arab countries, productivity 
growth has been negative; that is, the efficiency of the economy has markedly deteriorated. This 
situation  may  be  attributed  to  the  weak  business  environment  of  the  Arab  region  (limited 
openness  of  key  services  to  competition,  heightened  business  uncertainty  stemming  from 
commercial risks, and imperfections in the regulatory framework and economic governance) and 
to the low quality of human capital which hampers the profitability of investment.  
Based on this third explanation, strengthening the investment climate in the Arab region, making 
more  room  for  private  investment  in  services  and  network  industries,  which  have  been 
traditionally under the government’s umbrella, and  further improving access to finance, are  key 
to  fostering  private  investment  as  a  key  precondition  for  accelerated  growth  and  faster  job 
creation in the region.  
While all three explanations are appealing, the evidence to support them in many Arab countries 
is mostly outdated and often weak. I suspect we really do not know what is responsible for the 
growing crisis of unemployment in Arab region. Knowledge is always slow to catch up to reality 
especially because of scarcity of available Arab human capital and employment/workforce data.  
This  working  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  examines  the  main  trends  in  the 
Arab labor market affecting both supply and demand of the labor force, and presents an overall 
assessment  of  the  active  labor  market  programs  adopted  in  some  Arab  countries.  Section  3 
presents some programs and policies aiming to enhance employment opportunities of Arab youth. 
The final section, Section 3, provides the concluding remarks. 
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2. Main trends in the Arab labor markets 
2.1. Labor supply considerations 
2.1.1. Demographic changes and employment pressure 
As in  other  developing  areas, rapid  population  growth  in  the Arab  countries  during  the  second 
half  of  the  twentieth  century  was  the  outcome  of  rising  natural  increase  rates,  which  climbed 
from approximately 1.8 per cent in the 1930s and 1940s to a peak of 3 per cent in the early 1980s. 
Since then, the natural increase rates in virtually all of the Arab countries (with the exception of 
Mauritania,  Occupied  Palestinian  Territory  and  Yemen)  have  decreased  considerably,  due  to  a 
steady  decline  in  fertility  rates.  By  2000-2005,  the  average  natural  increase  rate  in  the  Arab 
region was 2.2 per cent and the average total fertility rate was 3.8 per cent. However, despite the 
substantial fertility  reduction,  the  natural  increase  rate  of the  Arab  countries  is  still  the  highest 
worldwide (average rate 2.65), even compared to less developed regions (average rate 2.9). 
<Insert TABLE 1:  Population and Fertility Rate in Arab countries (thousands)> 
The prolonged high natural increase rates in the Arab countries have led to the creation of a wide-
based age pyramid. By 2005, the percentage of 15 years of age within the total Arab population 
was 35.5 per cent (very high compared to less developed regions and the World where this age 
cohort represents 21 per cent and 19  per cent respectively). Thus, despite the fertility  reduction 
during the past 20 years, in terms of absolute numbers the population growth in the Arab region 
during  the  mid-2000s  was  similar  to  that  of  the  mid-1980s,  simply  as  a  function  of  the  sharp 
increase  in  the  number  of  couples  in  the  reproductive  ages.  This  phenomenon,  known  as  the 
population momentum, refers to the fact that the future population growth will be influenced by 
its present age structure. Thus, a large population increase will persist in all the Arab countries 
for at  least  several more  decades,  reflecting the  high  natural increase  rates  during the  past  two 
generations. 
<Insert TABLE 2: Percentage aged less than 15> 
The  implications  of  the  wide-based  age  structure  for  the  workforce  are  very  important.  In  the 
short term, the direct result of the high percentage of the young population has been low crude 
economic activity rates (around 30-40 per cent  in average by 1980). By comparison, the  crude 
economic activity rates in the European countries were much higher (around 50-60 per cent by 
1980),  due  both  to  higher  percentages  of  the  working-age  population  and  much  higher  female 
labor force participation rates. 
Thus, while  the  bread-winners/dependants  ratio  is  1  for 2  in  the  developed  countries,  the  same 
ratio is 1 for 4 in the Arab countries, leading to what has been called the low income trap. 
<Insert TABLE 3 : Adult (15+) economic activity rate > 
The long-term implications for the future size of the Arab workforces are no less significant. Due 
to the wide-based age pyramid, the number  of work opportunities needed in the Arab  countries 
will  continue  to  grow  rapidly,  at  least  in  the  coming  three  decades,  until  the  number  of  those   6 
entering the workforce, namely, those in the 20–24 age group, will be equal to those leaving the 
workforce at the age of 60–65.  
In Egypt, for example, in 2000, the 0–4 age group numbered 8.2 millions, while the 40–44 age 
group  amounted  to  only  3.74  millions.  This  means  that  the  number  of  those  entering  the 
workforce during the period of 2020–24 will be 2.2 times higher than the number of those retiring 
in the same years. In the case of Saudi Arabia, approximately 5.5 million citizens will be entering 
the labor force during the second decade of the twenty-first century, which is equal to 37 per cent 
of the current Saudi national labor force (14.7 millions in 2005). 
Moreover, during the past two decades, as a result of substantial growth in the female labor force 
participation rates, the labor force growth rates were higher than the natural increase rates. Since 
this  process  is  expected  to  continue,  it  is  reasonable  to  predict  an  even  higher  increase  in 
employment  demands  in  the  foreseeable  future.  With  an  average  growth  rate  of  more  than  3 
percent annually, Arab countries’ labor force is growing at a higher rate than any other region of 
the world. In spite of the global fall in birth rates, the high population growth rates of the past are 
continuing  to  push  new  entrants  into  the  job  market  more  quickly  than  the  ability  to  generate 
jobs. 
<Insert TABLE 4: Labor Force and Population Growth rates > 
The  wide-based  age  pyramid  also  hampers  efforts  to  enlarge  investments  in  education  in  per 
capita  terms,  due  to  the  steady  increase  in  the  size  of  the  school-age  populations.  This  rising 
demand  forces  the  Arab  governments  to  increase  their  educational  budgets  in  line  with  the 
increase  in  the  number  of  students  only  to  maintain  the  current  educational  level.  Thus,  the 
challenge  of  keeping  pace  with  the  advance  of  technology  is  made  even  more  difficult  to 
overcome. 
At  the  same  time,  in  many  Arab  countries,  governments  have  been  slow  to  understand  and 
respond  to  the  implications  of  a  changing  demographic  picture.  The  ratio  of  workers  to 
dependents in the region has long been the highest in the world, where 30% of the population 
worked  to  support  the  rest  in  1990,  compared  to  a  world  average  of  48%.  This  situation  is 
changing fast, since declining fertility rates mean that more people will enter the economically 
active population every year than  will be born.  This demographic transition over the  next  20 
years will open a significant window of economic opportunity for Arab countries. As happened in 
East Asia during the past two decades, a proportionately bigger and growing work force could 
potentially  add  2%  a  year  to  economic  growth  rates,  while  improving  rates  of  savings  and 
investment (Williamson and Yousef 1998, Yousef 2004). 
<Insert TABLE 5: Dependency Ratios >   7 
However, the mechanics of the demographic gift implicitly assume well-functioning labor and 
capital markets
4. In the absence of dynamic labor markets and steady output growth in the 1990s, 
the expanding working-age population contributed to the twin problems of unemployment and 
stagnant real wages. This was especially true for first-time job seekers whose unemployment rate 
was twice that of the labor force in a number of  Arab countries (Al-Qudsi, Assaad and Radwan 
1995). 
2.1.2. Women labor force participation and unemployment 
Women‟s economic participation rate, their proportion in the labor force, and their employment 
pattern  varies  among  the  sub-regions  of  the  Arab  world.  Interestingly  enough,  women‟s 
economic participation and labor force share are highest in the least developed economies of the 
region, such as the Djibouti, Comoros, Mauritania and Somalia, while they are the lowest in some 
of the more developed Gulf economies which have the highest female educational records. The 
participation record of women in the diversified economies of Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria 
and Tunisia tend to exhibit a rate close to the regional average. 
The proportion of women in the adult labor force has risen virtually in all Arab countries over the 
past  two  decades.  During  the  1990s,  female  labor  force  participation  rates  in  Arab  region 
increased  by  an  average  of  1.6  per  cent  per  year,  faster  than  any  other  region  in  the  world. 
Between 1980 and 2005, the participation of women in the labor force approximately doubled in 
Algeria and Bahrain,  more than  doubled  in  Kuwait, Libya and Saudi  Arabia,  while it almost 
tripled in the United Arab Emirates. 
Increases in female labor force participation cut across all age groups but are most evident among 
young women. The largest increases are in the labor force participation rates of 25-34 age cohort 
particularly in Libya, Algeria,  Kuwait, Bahrain and Tunisia. 
<Insert TABLE 6: Proportion of Women in the Labor Force> 
Despite the growing proportion of women in the labor force, their economic activity rate, namely, 
the percentage of the population that is economically active is remarkably lower than that of men 
in  the  Arab  region  particularly  for  the  age  cohort  35-54,  except  for  the  least  developed 
economies.  Excluding  these  countries,  in  1980,  the  economic  activity  rate  of  women  ranged 
between a minimum of 8.7 per cent in Saudia Arabia, and a maximum of 31.5 per cent in Sudan, 
while the economic activity rate of men varied between 63.4 per cent in West bank and Gaza and 
94.5 per cent in the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, throughout the Arab region, the gender 
gap in labor markets, defined as the differential between the activity rate of men and women, is 
remarkably wide. In 2005, the gap is narrowest in Kuwait and widest in Saudi Arabia, at 36 and 
60.7 per cent respectively. 
                                                   
4  Recent  cross-country  studies  indicate  that  national  savings/investment  ratios  are  strongly  influenced  by 
demographic transitions: high dependency rates depress both savings and investment, while a rise in the working age 
population induces the opposite (Higgins 1998; Lind and Malmberg 1999). Thus, the ability to absorb an expanding 
labor force, in the presence of functioning credit markets, would support a faster rate of capital accumulation and 
wage growth.   8 
<Insert TABLE 7: Women Economic Activity Rate> 
<Insert TABLE 8: Gender Gap in Economic Activity> 
In  the  least  developed  economies,  women‟s  relatively  high  participation  rates  are  generally 
explained by their heavy involvement in agriculture and in informal economic activity. As such, 
while their proportion in the labor force is well above the regional average, their employment 
record in the formal sectors of the economy is substantially low. On the other hand, in countries 
like Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, while women enjoy reasonably 
good  educational  levels,  women‟s  share  in  the  labor  force  is  relatively  low.  This  may  be 
explained by the presence of a cultural and value system which places considerable restrictions 
on the work of women in certain domains, particularly in the value added sectors of industry.  
As noted above, there exist substantial regional variations in female labor force participation rates 
in Arab region (excepting least developed Arab countries mentioned above). Table 7 reveals this 
fact and female economic activity rate in 2005 ranges from 10.3 per cent in West Bank and Gaza 
Strip to 49 per cent in Kuwait. Such variations illustrate the persistent gaps in literacy rates in 
general  and  educational  attainment  in  particular,  for  women,  especially  in  rural  areas. 
Furthermore, because of overall economic shrinking in many Arab countries, women’s chances 
of entering the labor market are greatly reduced compared to those of men, with many educated 
women staying out of the labor market due to lack of enough new job opportunities that would 
absorb both genders. Still, in situations of job scarcity, men in the Arab world are advantaged 
over women. On the other hand, women who succeed in entering the labor force often do not 
reach higher administrative and managerial positions, remaining largely within the government 
civil service in educational and social related jobs. 
The large increase in female labor force participation rates during the last two decades may have 
contributed to the high rates of unemployment, especially among young females. Indeed, data on 
selected Arab countries indicates that unemployment rates among females are the highest in the 
world, both in absolute terms and compared to unemployment rates for males. While the regional 
mean for women’s unemployment rate stands at 15.5%, compared to 9.9% for men, considerable 
regional variations exist. In Egypt for instance, women’s unemployment rate is roughly fourfold 
that of men, standing at 23.9% and 6.3%, respectively. The highest female unemployment rates 
are recorded for Syria, standing at 24.1%, compared to 8.3% male unemployment, while Kuwait 
records the lowest female unemployment rate, listed at 1.7%. 
A common trend in the pattern of unemployment is differentiation by gender. In Egypt, Jordan, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Tunisia, women's unemployment rates not only are considerably 
higher than men's but they are disproportionately high given women's far smaller share in the 
labor force.  
The  international  empirical  evidence  on  the  link  between  increasing  female  labor  force 
participation rates and gender differences in unemployment is very limited. Other countries and 
regions,  at  various  times,  have  experienced  sizable  and  sustained  gender  differences  in 
unemployment rates. Azmat et al. (2004) find that, for a panel of OECD countries, gender gaps in 
unemployment rates are mostly concentrated among Mediterranean countries, but reasons for this 
gap remain largely unexplained. The researchers suggest that gender-based discrimination may   9 
explain  part  of  this  gap.  Seguino  (2002)  finds  that  aggregate  economic  conditions  and  job 
segregation explain part of the gender differences in unemployment rates in Caribbean countries. 
High unemployment rates might encourage females to look for work in order to help support their 
families (the added  worker  effect), resulting in  higher  female unemployment rates. However, 
most  of  the  differences  again  remain  unexplained,  leading  Seguino  to  suggest  possible 
discrimination. 
<Insert TABLE 9: Unemployment rate> 
In  the  Arab  countries,  it  is  tempting  to  attribute  part  of  the  large  gender  differences  in 
unemployment rates to increases in relative female labor force participation. To the extent that 
males and females tend to work in different occupations, higher rates of female entry into the 
labor force may lead to higher female unemployment rates that can persist over long periods of 
time, but which are also transitory in nature. Once female labor force participation rates reach a 
new steady state, male and female unemployment rates will converge (Myatt and Murrell, 1990). 
In this case, no policy intervention is required. A preliminary analysis, using a cross-section of 
MENA countries, finds a positive correlation of 0.32 between changes in labor force participation 
rates  between 1990 and 2000 and gender differences in unemployment rates around the year 
2000. Female unemployment in these countries appears to be part of an overall problem of labor 
force insertion. 
Social  norms  might  also  be  an  important  factor  in  explaining  gender  differences  in 
unemployment rates. Social norms may limit the mobility of women (by requiring them to obtain 
work close to their homes or limiting their ability to drive). Social norms may limit international 
mobility,  by  discouraging  females  in  labor-abundant  countries  from  seeking  employment 
elsewhere, while encouraging males. This would relieve domestic labor supply pressures in male-
dominated  occupations,  but  not  in  female-dominated  occupations.  Social  norms  may  limit 
females‟ ability to search for appropriate jobs, by dictating what constitutes acceptable work for 
females and males.  
2.1.3. Urbanization and internal migration 
Populations in the Arab region tend to be unequally distributed on the land, both among Arab 
countries and within each country. While all six GCC countries together have a population of 
about 32 million (with Saudi Arabia alone having about 22 million inhabitants), Egypt alone has 
a population  of about 69 million. The  density per  square kilometre  varies  sharply  from three 
persons  in  Libya  to  as  many  as  1,000  in  Bahrain.  One  reason  for  this  is  that  a  very  large 
percentage  of  Arab  region  is  austere  desert.  Thus,  in  Egypt  the  non-desert  areas  of  the  Nile 
Valley and the Delta have a density of over 1,200 inhabitants per square kilometre, while the 
desert areas (over 95% of total territory) have a density of one. 
This characteristic of the region explains why, despite the vastness of territory, many villages and 
cities appear to be overcrowded. This pattern also implies mounting pressures on the limited non-
desert areas in the region. About 70% of the poor in the Arab region live in rural areas, even 
though rural areas support less than 43% of the total population. Together with several political 
and socio-economic factors, this situation has triggered a stream of rural-urban migration in all   10 
Arab countries, leading to rapid urbanization and, in turn, to the transformation of urban spaces 
into increasingly significant clusters of communities originating from the countryside.  
In 1960, only 30 per  cent  of  the  Arab  population lived in cities. By 2005, urban areas  were 
estimated to contain over 80 per cent of the populations in 8 Arab counties and more than 50 per 
cent of the population in all Arab countries, expect for Egypt (42.3 percent), Somalia (35.9 per 
cent) and Yemen (26.3 per cent), which remain predominantly rural.  
<Insert TABLE 10: Urbanization rate> 
The inflow of rural migrants in Arab region has been much more rapid than the pace at which 
they  are  absorbed  into  the  market.  As  a  result,  many  cities  in  the  region  are  populated  with 
unemployed and underemployed people. 
One of the major consequences of the rapid urbanization process has been  indeed the rapidly 
increasing supply of job seekers in both the modern-formal and traditional-informal sectors of the 
urban economy. In most Arab countries, the supply of workers far exceeds the demand, the result 
being extremely high rates of unemployment and underemployment in urban areas. Accordingly, 
migration can no longer be casually viewed by economists as a beneficent process necessary to 
solve  problems  of  growing  urban  labor  demand.  On  the  contrary,  migration  today  remains  a 
major factor contributing to the phenomenon of urban surplus labor; a force that continues to 
exacerbate already serious urban unemployment problems caused by the growing economic and 
structural  imbalances  between  urban  and  rural  areas.  Accordingly,  the  new  orthodoxy,  due 
mainly  to  Todaro  (1969)  and  Harris-Todaro  (1970),  considers  rural-urban  migration  as  a 
symptom of and a countributing factor to underdevelopment. Indeed, assuming potential migrants 
respond to the urban employment probability and treating rural-urban migration primarily as an 
economic  phenomenon,  the  authors  then  demonstrates  that,  in  certain  parametric  ranges,  an 
increase in urban employment may actually result in higher levels of urban unemployment and 
even reduced national product (the so-called Todaro Paradox). 
The paradox is due to the assumptions that in choosing between labor markets, risk-neutral agents 
consider expected wages, that the probability of obtaining urban employment is approximated by 
the ratio of urban jobs to the urban labor force, and that the urban wage rate is considerably and 
consistently higher than the rural wage rate. Under these assumptions, inter-labor market (rural-
urban) equilibrium mandates urban unemployment. This unemployment ensures that the expected 
urban wage is equal to the rural wage (which is assumed constant throughout). The repercussion 
of this simple set of assumptions is that contrary to received wisdom, once the migration response 
is  factored  in,  several  policies  aimed  at  reducing  urban  unemployment  will  raise  urban 
unemployment rather than reduce it. 
Rural-urban migration is linked to changes in the sectoral distribution of employment. Since the 
1970s, the share of employment in agriculture declined rapidly until the mid 1980s and more 
slowly  since  then.  However,  manufacturing  and  other  industries  have  not  increased 
proportionally to the decline of the agricultural sector. The development of urban areas is still 
closely tied to the rural economy through the exchange of labor, goods, services, information and 
technology. Remittances from urban areas to rural areas are an important source of income for   11 
rural populations in the Arab region as elsewhere. In Morocco, for example, urban remittances 
are as high as 30% of the income of the poor (World Bank, 2000).    
Statistics and empirical studies on internal migration in Arab Countries are quite rare. Below, we 
provide brief review of previous empirical studies devoted to the topic of internal migration in 
some Arab countries: 
  Syria: In Syria, in contrast to other Middle Eastern and North African countries which 
were also witness to a large rural–urban migration, the major proportion of the migration 
movement has occurred within the borders of the provinces themselves, rather than from 
the rural regions to the capital. 
One  of  the  most  comprehensive  analytic  study  of  internal  migration  in  Syria  is  the 
completed  Strategic  National  Plan  for  internal  Migration  in  the  Syrian  Arab  Republic 
(Zakaria and El Sibai, 1991), sponsored by the State Planning Commission in cooperation 
with UNFPA and ILO. It reports the results of a large internal migration household survey 
carried out in 1987. The survey is based on a sample of 5,000 households in three cities 
(Damascus,  Aleppo  and  Homs)  and  a  sample  of  about  3,000  households  selected 
randomly from the rural sector of the country as a whole. One of the main conclusions of 
the study is that unemployment in the countryside is an important determinant of citywide 
migration and migrants in the city are involved mainly in service jobs, marginal work, and 
the public sector, and hence migration is a means of transplanting surplus laborers of the 
cities. Furthermore, villagers have a desire to migrate for a better income jobs in urban 
areas, owing to the disparities in wage levels and job opportunities between the city and 
the countryside. This is reinforced by the higher educational attainment of the rural youth 
population. 
In 2000, the Syria Internal Migration Survey project (SIMS in short) has been conducted 
jointly between the University of Damascus, the Syrian central Bureau of Statistics and 
Fafo  institute  for  Applied  International  Studies.  Interviews  with  more  than  20,000 
families  were  successfully  completed.  The  sample  is  based  on  a  multi-stage  stratified 
design,  using  a  sampling  frame  constructed  from  the  1994  census  of  population  and 
household listings updated of all the selected clusters. Several conclusions can be drawn 
from this project. First, a disproportionally large number of migrants are of rural origin. 
Second, the dominant form of migration in Syria, with respect to direction, seems to be 
from rural to urban areas. Third, rural-urban migration is often attributed to an urban bias 
in development planning. However, the evidence is mixed and there is some  evidence 
pointing to more migration as a result of enterprise development in the countryside. Forth, 
for  male  migrants  work  related  motives  dominate  while  for  female  migrants  marriage 
related reasons are more important.  
  Egypt: In Egypt, the acceleration of the urbanization process began in the late 1930s and 
early 1940s. Internal migration is responsible for the redistribution of nearly 25 percent of 
Egypt's  population,  and  for  the  rapid  growth  of  Egyptian  cities,  especially  Cairo  and 
Alexandria.   12 
Table 11 gives an overview of internal migration for urban and rural areas by rural/urban 
origin or destination in Egypt for the last three censuses (1976, 1986, and 1996). Some 
key points can be drawn out of this Table. The first feature is the remarkable constancy of 
the  total  migration  recorded  in  each  of  the  three  censuses.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
disaggregation  of  migration  types  shows  that  these  disaggregated  flows  are  indeed 
changing.  Hence  total  migration  remains  curiously  constant,  whilst  the  individual 
components  of  that  mobility  are  markedly  shifting.  Two  noteworthy  trends  can  be 
highlighted: the sharp fall of rural to urban migration between 1976 (25 percent) and 1986 
(13 percent), and the  equally  sharp rise  of urban to rural migration  between 1986 (10 
percent) and 1996 (23 percent).  
<Insert TABLE 11: Urban/rural migration by type of movement, Egypt, 1976–1996> 
These trends, however, do not represent the full extent of rural-urban migration in Egypt. 
First, long-distance rural–urban migration to Cairo from Upper Egypt is a long-standing 
phenomenon in Egypt, traceable to the first census around a hundred years ago. Second, 
much  of  the  increase  in  urban–rural  migration  between  1986  and  1996  is  probably 
explained by return migration of retired rural–urban migrant workers back to their home 
villages, these rural-origin migrants having migrated to the cities in earlier decades. Third, 
we can strongly suspect that the bulk of rural laborers to Cairo are not officially registered 
by the census as rural–urban migrants because of their continuing de jure residence in 
rural areas. Yet another factor is the fact that a significant percent of migrants from rural 
to urban areas (especially to Cairo) tend to hide their rural origin and to claim that they are 
not migrants from rural areas. And finally some rural–urban migrants may escape census 
counts because of their “hidden” residence as squatters with no fixed abode. 
The reasons of rural–urban migration in Egypt are almost the same as in Syria and most 
other developing countries. Push factors have constituted the dominant reasons, while pull 
factors  function only as  secondary reasons.  Push  factors  include  scarcity of cultivated 
land, low  level and instability of income in  the rural areas,  concentration  of the rural 
economy almost exclusively on agriculture, and the gap in health care and educational 
services between the urban centers and the rural areas. The pull factors are mainly the 
desire for acquisition of higher education, industrial development in urban centers, and the 
generally more attractive urban work and social facilities. One of the strongest factors in 
Egyptian internal migration is the search for better work opportunities than those existing 
at points of origin. 
  Morocco:  The  degree  of  urbanization  of  Morocco  in  the  twentieth  century  is 
unexceptional by Third World and North African standards. Both Algeria and Tunisia, for 
example,  have  a  somewhat  higher  rate  of  urbanization.  Urbanization  and  partial  de-
agrarization are general processes which also occur within rural Morocco, in which so-
called  rural  populations  increasingly  earn  additional  income  outside  the  traditional 
agricultural  sector.  Previously,  such  livelihood  diversification  was  achieved  primarily 
through  long-distance  internal  migration.  However,  the  development  of  numerous 
centrally  located  villages  into  small  or  medium-sized  urban  centers  is  increasingly 
offering non-agricultural employment within the “rural” provinces themselves (Berriane 
1996; De Haas 2003).   13 
This process of micro- and meso-urbanization, which has presumably been encouraged by 
decentralization  policies  and  significant  improvements  in  road  and  electricity 
infrastructure, over the interior of Morocco, has affected patterns of internal migration. An 
increasing  number  of  internal  migrants  do  not  settle  in  the  big  cities,  but  in  rapidly 
growing  smaller  and  medium-sized  towns  near  to  or  within  the  rural  provinces 
themselves. 
The second major source of Morocco's urban growth, after the high natural population 
increase, is rural migration which generally accounts for one third of the overall increase 
of urban population. For several decades, migration to the cities absorbed around two-
thirds of the annual natural increase in rural areas. Rural poverty has always tended to be 
the main driving force behind rural–urban migration in Morocco. In the early 1960s, about 
25 percent of the families in rural areas were landless, 50 percent had less than 3 hectares, 
and only 25 percent of rural families had more than 3 hectares. If rural poverty has been 
the main push factor, urban amenities such as education, health, and cultural services have 
been the main pull factors in the Moroccan case.  
More recent trends in rural–urban migration in Morocco can be investigated based on the 
1991 Survey on Internal Migration reported in the 1995 African Population Newsletter. 
Morocco has experienced a recent rise in urban population from 29.3 percent of the total 
population in the early 1960s to 48.4 percent three decades later. Rural–urban migration 
averages  3.6  percent  annually  and  has  played  a  key  role  over  the  past  30  years  in 
population redistribution. In the survey of 1991, 33 percent of migrants reported the main 
reason for migration as the search for better jobs or better wages, 31 percent indicated 
migration was in order to join a family member or spouse, and 11 percent migrated for 
educational reasons. Some 87.7 percent of migrants were under 30 years old at time of 
departure;  39.5  percent  were  under  15  years,  25  percent  were  15–19  years,  and  23.2 
percent were 20–29 years old. 
The  1991  survey  revealed  that  men  tended  to  migrate  for  economic  reasons,  whereas 
women migrated primarily for family reasons. Most men were unmarried at the time of 
migration, while most women were already married. Four-fifths of migrating women did 
not have a formal education. About half of the men and the same share of the women 
were  classed  as  unskilled.  Only  7  percent  sent  remittances  to  relatives  in  rural  areas, 
although 70 percent visited at least once a year. 
One important outcome of rural-urban migration has been the growth of the so-called informal 
sector in urban areas. Although associated with hidden unemployment, urban under-employment 
and poverty, informal activities have become a means for many countries to cope with population 
growth,  rural-urban  migration,  economic  crises  and  unemployment.  In  some  countries  of  the 
Arab region, the informal sector is estimated to contribute anywhere between one-quarter and 
two-thirds of non-agricultural employment, with Algeria (1985) at 25.4 percent, Tunisia (1989) at 
39.3  percent,  Morocco  (1982)  at 56.9  percent,  Egypt  (1986)  at 65.3  percent,  and  Mauritania 
(1988) at 75.3 percent.   14 
2.1.4. International migration 
The South Mediterranean and Middle East constitute probably the most remarkable geographical 
region of the world with respect to labor migration movements. Of the top ten countries recorded 
in the 2004 Human Development Report, the  first  four are Middle Eastern,  with another two 
ranked as sixth and ninth. Table 12 shows UN data for 2000: the highest ratio of migrants to total 
population not in the Arab region is in Singapore, with 34% (UNDP, 2004). In fact, the UN data 
seem to be underestimates, as most national data indicate even higher levels of migrant presence. 
<Insert TABLE 12: Estimated migrant stocks circa 2000 in the Arab region> 
The particularities of the region are not confined, however, to these simple stocks of temporary 
labor migrants in the Gulf countries. To this we should add the recent emigration histories of the 
Maghreb  and  Mashrek  countries,  along  with  their  demographic  pressures  for  continued 
emigration, the role of the latter as transit countries for illegal migrants from other regions, and 
the role of GCC states as a massive source of both recorded and unrecorded remittances to Asia 
and elsewhere. 
It is possible to discern several migration systems operating in the region, although these are in 
flux and increasingly overlapping and becoming more complex. There are three broad systems, 
comprised of the GCC, Maghreb and Mashrek states.  
The GCC countries 
The main population flows within the  Arab region have been associated with labor migration 
from non-oil producing Mashreq countries, especially Egypt and Yemen, but also Jordan and 
Palestine and to a lesser degree Syria and Iraq, to the oil-producing countries within the GCC: 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Although official 
data on these flows is either unavailable or not sufficiently accurate and reliable, most analysts 
agree that this type of regional migration peaked in the mid-80s. Employment estimates of Arab 
labor migrants to the Gulf during this period range between a low of 1.54 million to a high of 
3.45 million. 
<Insert TABLE 13: Estimated Percentage of nationals and expatriates in the population of GCC 
countries, 1995-2000> 
Long before the Gulf crisis in 1990 and the subsequent war in 1991, GCC states started to recruit 
workers from Asia.  The economic argument posited for this change in employment patterns was 
that Asian workers worked for less money and were more productive. Yet, in order to understand 
the recruitment policy drives of the GCC states in this period, non-economic considerations also 
need to be given weight. Moreover, the sheer presence and dependence on foreign labor was felt 
to pose a threat and measures were taken to make this migration phenomenon temporary rather 
than permanent. As Arab migrants had often tried to bring over their families, Asian workers 
appeared  to  be  the  safer  choice  in  terms  of  both  their  politics  and  their  status  as  temporary 
migrants. 
The preference for non-Arab foreign nationals became even more pertinent in the aftermath of 
the invasion of Kuwait and Yemen, Jordan and Palestine‟s support for Iraq. About 1.5 million   15 
people were displaced in the wake of the Gulf crisis in 1990/1991: about 800,000 Yemenis were 
expelled from Saudi Arabia, alongside 200,000 Jordanians and 350,000 Palestinians who were 
mainly expelled from Kuwait. No in-depth research has been carried out to study the impact of 
this situation on the economies and poverty levels of the sending countries. But obviously the 
lack  of  remittances,  as  well  as  pressures  on  local  labor  markets  have  been  a  huge  burden, 
especially in Yemen, Egypt and Jordan where unemployment and recession rose significantly. 
In the mid 1990s, Asian labor migrants from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Thailand,  Korea  and  Bangladesh  outnumbered  Arab  migrants  by  about  one  million  (Girgis, 
2002). However, a more in-depth study of Kuwait from 1989-2000 reveals that despite a decrease 
in  numbers,  Arab  migrant  workers  have  dominated  the  upper  echelons  of  skill  categories 
(technical, managerial and clerical), while Asian workers have dominated services, agriculture 
and  production-related  jobs.  Jobs  in  sales  have  also  been  dominated  by  Arab  workers.  It  is 
interesting to note that the overall foreign Arab population outnumbered the Asian population as 
many  Arab  workers  tend  to  migrate  with  their  families  while  Asian  workers  (both  men  and 
women)  migrate  on  their  own.  This  is  partly  related  to  the  conditions  (salaries,  housing  etc) 
related to high and low skilled jobs as well as the particular migration culture of Arab and Asian 
workers. 
Since the 1990s, there has been a new trend influencing recruitment strategies and, potentially, 
future  populations  flows.  As  a  result  of  persistently  weak  oil  prices,  financial  contributions, 
depleted foreign assets and loss due to two Gulf wars (1980-1988, 1991), the GCC countries have 
started to experience recessions, and for the first time have recorded unemployment figures for 
nationals. In Saudi-Arabia, for example, the Manpower Council estimated the unemployment rate 
among Saudi nationals at 14% in 2000 and at 15 % in 2001. In addition to an economic crisis, 
GCC  countries  face  a  large  pool  of  young  first  time  job  seekers,  who  benefited  from  the 
expanded and improved education system. About half a million GCC nationals are unemployed 
in a region that employs 7.5 million expatriate workers. All GCC states have introduced policies 
to reduce rising unemployment among their nationals, and to maintain or increase birth rates in 
order to curtail their dependence on foreign labor. 
Whatever obstacles exist in the present time to speed up the process of the nationalization of the 
labor force, there is no doubt that, in the long run, national workers will replace a large number of 
expatriate workers.  As GCC nationals will seek well paid skilled jobs, this trend will affect Arab 
migrants  much  more  than  Asian  migrants  who  are  predominately  found  in  low  skilled  jobs. 
Girgis  (2002)  predicts  slow  Arab  out-migration  over  the  next  decades.  According  to  his 
estimates, the current out-migration in Arab countries will amount to a loss of remittances worth 
$1.55 billion over the period of 2003-2007 alone. In addition, there will be an increase in return 
migration which, in turn, will lead to greater pressures on local labor markets and may lead to 
greater unemployment rates.  
The Maghreb 
Since 1968, Morocco has had a consistent policy of maximizing emigration in order to manage 
unemployment levels, acquire hard currency through remittances, and raise skill levels through 
returning migrants. Tunisia and Algeria, initially followed a similar policy to that of Morocco; 
however, both encouraged their emigrants to return in the 1970s. Regardless of these differences   16 
in  policy,  the  outcome  by  1999  was  some  700  thousands  each  of  Moroccans  and  Algerians 
residing in France, plus over 200 thousands Tunisians (Fargues, 2004). Their total presence in 
other  European  countries  is  of  the  same  order,  although  the  total  of  Moroccans  abroad  is 
estimated  at  2,5  million  or  nearly  10%  of  the  current  population.  IOM  gives  the  expatriate 
Tunisian population at 690 thousands, of which 590 thousands are in Europe and 90 thousands in 
other  Maghreb  or  Arab  states  (IOM,  2004).  Remittances  are  also  the  most  significant  for 
Morocco, which is the fourth largest recipient in the world with US$3,3 billion in 2001, at 9,7% 
of GDP (Gallina, 2004). 
Over  the  last  two  decades,  the  emigration  of  highly  skilled  professionals  from  Morocco  and 
Algeria has become of great concern. There are no available statistics on the large numbers who 
have left for the USA, Canada, Germany and France: however, in just one scientific institution in 
France there are over 1 600 researchers from the Maghreb, of which nearly half are Moroccan 
(Mghari, 2004). The reasons for the exodus of professionals are not only pay-related, but also 
reflect general labor market and  social conditions,  such as lack of career opportunity and job 
satisfaction. However, the result of the brain drain is that enterprises are starved of skilled and 
motivated staff, and foreign experts are needed to fill the gaps: the costs of such international 
expertise are as much as 60-90% of development aid or investment costs (Mghari, 2004). 
The Mashrek 
The Mashrek countries of Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen have a migratory 
history between them dating back to the end of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire (al Khouri, 2004). However, the important period of emigration to the oil-rich GCC states 
began in the 1970s. Indeed, it was not until 1971 that Egypt openly permitted emigration of its 
nationals, and then rapidly embarked on a policy of linking emigration policy with the country‟s 
economic  development.  Although  with  different  national histories and  specificities, all  of the 
Mashrek has had extensive involvement with emigration over the last three decades. Most of this 
has been temporary labor migration to other Mashrek countries, and primarily to GCC countries. 
The common characteristics can be summarized as the following: 
  Mass temporary and permanent emigration since the 1970s. 
  Economic development strategies have been linked with diaspora and remittances. 
  Forcible return of migrants, from the GCC states during the first Gulf crisis, has created 
serious economic problems. 
  Demographic structure now requires even more job creation for young people. 
  Brain drain is significant for all Mashrek countries. 
Brain drain is defined in the literature as emigration of more than 10% of the tertiary-educated 
population  of  a  particular  country  (Richard,  2003).The  traditional  view  sees  international 
mobility  of  skilled  workers  as  a  zero-sum  game  between  the  nations.  Since  education  is 
considered as a major determinant of long-term economic growth, (the large-scale) departure of 
well-educated workers from developing countries is detrimental to source countries and loss to 
the state in terms of its investment in education. Furthermore, as skilled labor is instrumental in   17 
attracting FDI and foster R&D expenditures, the mobility of human capital is contributing to the 
concentration of economic activities in specific locations at the expense of origin regions. 
The loss of skilled people imposes different kinds of cost the most obvious one is the cost of 
education  itself  which  in  most  cases  has  been  subsidized  by  the  state.  Losses  of  skilled 
professionals  may  in  some  cases  be  a  net  developmental  loss  when  dire  economic 
mismanagement  and  poor  working  conditions  and  low  level  of  reward  conspire  with 
opportunities abroad lead to endanger sectors of an economy. According to this view, therefore, 
the  negative  development  impact  of  such  poor  countries  must  be  mitigated  by  support  for 
education and training in  the  countries  particularly  in  fields  where  needed  skills  are in  short 
supply.  
Recently  however,  this  traditional  view  is  challenged  by  new  counter  arguments  which  ask 
whether  the  detrimental  effects  stressed  in  the  early  literature  may  be  offset  by  potentially 
beneficial  effects  emphasised  in  more  recent  contributions  (remittances,  return  migration, 
creation of trade and business networks, and possible incentive effects of migration prospects on 
human  capital  formation  at  home).  It  is  stressed  that  these  beneficial  effects  or  “positive 
externalities” on source countries should be taken into account in economic calculations; and in 
spite of the problems posed, a realistic response requires abandoning the brain drain approach of 
trying to keep the highly skilled at home.  
In the brain drain debate, one of the key figures used is the ratio of the educated migrants within 
the migrant population. One striking fact is that the tertiary educated migrants are a small portion 
of the overall migrant population, especially in large migrant sending countries such as Algeria, 
Morocco  and  Tunisia.  For  example,  between  10-15%  of  migrants  have  tertiary  education  in 
Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria as of year 2000. On the other hand, more than 50% of migrants to 
OECD countries from other countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan have tertiary 
education.  
The  data  available  reveal  that  the  migrants  from  almost  every  developing  country  are  more 
educated  than  the  native  population.  There  are  many  reasons  for  this  selection  effect  –  the 
migration policies of the receiving  countries are  biased towards  educated  migrants, they  face 
fewer  constraints  in  terms  of  financial  and  social  costs  when  they  migrate,  the  returns  to 
migration are higher etc. The selection effect is stronger for some countries compared to others. 
For example, among the countries in the region, Turkish migrants are the most similar to native 
population in terms of  education profile  – around 10%  of  natives and  migrants  have  tertiary 
education. Similarly, the bias is relatively small for North African countries such as Morocco and 
Tunisia. On the other hand, the bias is largest for the GCC countries and Egypt – over 60% of 
migrants have tertiary education as opposed to 15% of the native population. 
The most important question in the brain drain debate is what per cent of the educated population 
migrate. It is  possible  that  educated migrants  form a large portion of the  migrant  population. 
However, if the underlying native population is also highly educated, then the economic impact 
of migration is not likely to be negative on the sending country. For example, this is the case in 
India and China. Even though majority of Indian migrants, especially to the US, have college 
degrees, they still present a small portion of the educated labor force in India.    18 
2.1.5. Educational systems and labor supply: The skills mismatch 
Education has been recognized by all countries in the region as the cornerstone of sustainable 
social  and  economic  development.  However,  there  has  been  little  progress  in  reforming  and 
restructuring education  to produce an  educated,  creative,  flexible  workforce,  characterized  by 
technological competencies and marketable skills, able to adapt to fast-changing technologies, 
economies, and innovations.  
Since the 1960s, the countries of the region have made considerable investments in education. In 
1997  their  spending  on  education  was  estimated,  on  average,  at  5.4%  of  their  GNP.  This 
commitment has paid off, for school life expectancy in the region grew between 1960 and 1985 
by 2.5 years on average, and many of the region‟s countries are now close to the objective of 
universal primary education. However, in the absence of a comprehensive educational policy, this 
increased spending has not resulted in improvements in quality or efficiency in the educational 
system
5. 
In an age of knowledge intensity, poor knowledge acquisition, let alone its production, is a 
serious shortfall. A telling indicator of the poor level of educational attainment in the Arab 
countries is the persistence of illiteracy rates that are higher, and educational enrollment rates that 
are lower, than those of dynamic less developed countries in East Asia and Latin America. 
Indeed, while education has made headway among the younger generations, illiteracy has proved 
difficult to eradicate and the overall educational achievement among adults in Arab countries 
remains low on average. Arab countries have nevertheless made tangible progress in improving 
literacy: the estimated rate of illiteracy among adults dropped from approximately 60 per cent in 
1980 to around 43 per cent in the mid-1990s. However, illiteracy rates in the Arab world are still 
higher  than the international average and are  even higher than the average  in developing 
countries. Moreover, the number of illiterate people is still increasing, to  the extent that Arab 
countries embark upon the twenty-first century burdened by over 60 million illiterate adults, the 
majority of whom are women with the largest concentration being in rural areas. 
The mid-1990s witnessed higher total enrollment rates for the secondary and tertiary levels in the 
Arab countries (54 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively) compared to developing countries (49 
per cent and 9 per cent, respectively). However, these percentages are lower by far than those 
prevailing  in  the  indu strialized  countries  for  that  period  (106  percent
6  and  60  percent, 
respectively). Accordingly, Arab countries are not expected to catch up with the industrialized 
countries‟ mid-1990s enrollment levels for all three levels of education before 2030. 
Educational  output  and  student  achievement  have  remained  below  acceptable  standards. 
Textbooks  and  teaching  methods  are,  for  the  most  part,  outdated  and  do  not  take  into 
consideration the technology-dependent world students will face upon graduation. This indicates 
                                                   
5 It is important to note here that not all countries in the region suffer the same ills in education. While there are 
general deficiencies in different areas to greater or larger extents, there are also models of excellence and success 
stories in some countries, and pockets of weakness and strength within the same country. Both at the general and 
higher education levels there are a number of distinguished and reputable schools and institutions that can be used as 
models. What is lacking is a system that governs education and sets measurable standards of performance. 
6 A gross enrollment rate may exceed 100 per cent, if there are students enrolled in a level who are younger or older 
than the age span for that level   19 
a lack of  planning and the absence  of  clear long-term  goals.  Additionally, in  most  countries, 
education spending has been ad hoc and inconsistent varying greatly from one year to the next 
and  from  one  area  to  another.  The  expenditures  made  have  not  been  used  wisely  and  the 
investment has failed to pay off. 
Moreover, there are indications that rising expenditure on education in the Arab world began to 
taper off after 1985. Education spending increased, in current prices, from $18 billion in 1980 to 
$28 billion in 1995. However, the rate of increase since 1985 has been much slower than that 
during the period 1980-1985, unlike the situation in both developed and developing countries. On 
the  basis  of  the  rather  defective  indicator  often  used  in  international  comparisons  (education 
expenditure as a percentage of Gross National Product) Arab countries do better than developing 
and  developed  countries  alike  and  the  percentage  was  on  the  rise  between  1980  and  1985. 
However, the percentage was lower in 1995 than in 1985. 
A better indicator is per capita expenditure on education. At current prices, this indicator rose 
over the years from 1980 to 1985. However, this rise was followed by deterioration during the 
latter half of the 1980s. While Arab countries continued to spend more on education per capita 
than developing countries as a group, their relative edge has been eroding since the mid-1980s. In 
addition, per capita expenditure on education in Arab countries dropped from 20 per cent of that 
in industrialized countries in 1980 to 10 per cent in the mid-1990s. 
The  absence  of  proper  educational  planning  and  goal  setting  is  also  evident  in  the  lack  of 
compatibility between educational goals and individual and social development needs, on the one 
hand, and the demands of the labor market, on the other. In most publicly funded schools in the 
region, educational curricula are outdated and heavily dependent on rote learning and theoretical 
information. Subject matters tend to have little relevance to the real world. This is true of the 
general, vocational and higher education systems to varying degrees. 
At the vocational level, training programs are supply-driven rather than demand-driven and do 
not correspond to the needs and realities of the labor market. In most countries of the region the 
vocational  training  system  lacks  comprehensive  national  strategies  compatible  with  the  labor 
market  and  the  needs  of  the  new,  technology-driven  global  market,  which  often  means  that 
vocational training institutions will produce workers with no jobs to fill. Vocational training, also 
suffers from not being accorded the prestige that is given to higher education. Therefore, students 
who opt out of the academic system to join vocational training programs are faced with under-
funded  programs,  technologically  irrelevant  and  out-dated  courses,  outmoded  facilities, 
insufficiently  trained  instructors  and  no  reliable  methods  of  assessing  and  evaluating  the 
standards,  quality  and  relevance  of  programs  and  courses.  In  most  cases  students  have  not 
received proper guidance or career counseling and have no idea about the future employment 
prospects in any given vocation.  
With the exception of Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria the proportion of upper secondary students 
enrolled in vocational or technical subjects is less than 30% of the total secondary enrollment. In most 
countries of the region (for example, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates,  Sudan,  and  Yemen)  the  proportion  of  secondary  enrollees  in  technical  or  vocational 
education falls below 20%. The global average for 2005 is approximately 17% of upper secondary 
enrollments, although Developed world approaches 52%.   20 
<Insert TABLE 14: Unemployment by level of education> 
<Insert TABLE 15: Enrollment in vocational education > 
Accordingly, while great numbers of unemployed youth in the Arab region actively seek work, 
critical  shortages  of  qualified  workers  continue to  exist.  As local industries  explore new and 
innovative  lines  of  business,  they  demand  workers  with  a  strong  work  ethic,  entrepreneurial 
mindsets, and  cutting-edge  professional and technical  training.  Educational systems, however, 
have proven inadequate in meeting this need, and first rate professional and technical schools are 
virtually nonexistent. As a result, the cycle toward human development comes to a standstill: 
young people sit idle without quality jobs or a promising future, and employers are unable to 
expand  their  operations  to  spark  the  economic  growth  necessary  for  the  creation  of  a  viable 
middle class. 
<Insert TABLE 16: Youth unemployment> 
The awareness in the region  of the importance  of  education and its  central role  in achieving 
sustainable human and social development and a competitive edge on the global market has not 
been matched by the provision of the tools necessary to set effective policies and put in place 
implementable goals and strategies to achieve it. Indeed, some of the most significant reasons for 
many of the ills that plague the educational system at all levels in the Arab region are the lack of 
information and education management information systems, on which to build coherent policies 
and decision-making strategies, the lack of proper systems of accreditation, and the mismatch 
between educational output and the labor market.  
Low labor productivity 
Consequently, growth in Arab countries has been seriously hampered by low and declining labor 
productivity.  According to World Bank  data (1998/99 World Development Report), GNP per 
worker in all  Arab countries combined  was less than half that  of two comparator developing 
countries: Argentina and the Republic of Korea. 
Dividing Arab countries into three groups (each of which accounts for about one third of the 
Arab workforce) according to the share of oil in GNP sharpens this picture: 
  In the  first  group of  nine  Arab  countries that are richest  in  oil resources, productivity 
barely exceeds half the level in the two comparator countries;  
  for  the  middle  group  with  respect  to  oil‟s  share  in  GDP  (Egypt,  Syria,  and  Tunisia), 
productivity is less than one sixth of the comparators‟;  
  in the oil-poor Arab countries (Djibouti, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Somalia, 
Sudan, and Yemen) it is less than one tenth.    21 
 
This result suggests that excluding the effect of oil revenues might reduce productivity estimates 
for Arab economies to a greater extent than the simple overall comparison given above. 
More important than measures of the level of productivity, however, are measures of changes in 
it over time. World Bank estimates of total factor productivity in the MENA region showed a 
steady decline (-0.2 per cent a year) from 1960 to 1990, compared to rapid acceleration in other 
parts of the world. Data from the 1998/1999 World Development Report permit comparisons of 
GDP per worker in nine Arab countries with that in faster-growing developing countries during 
the periods 1980-1990 and 1990-1997. On this basis, annual productivity is estimated to have 
risen by 15 per cent in China, 8 per cent in the Republic of Korea, and 6 per cent in India but only 
4 percent in the Arab countries. 
Low levels of growth and productivity can be partly explained by the fact that Arab countries lag 
behind  faster-growing  developing  countries  in  a  key  human-capabilities  variable:  years  of 
education. A comparison with the three Asian Tigers is revealing. In 1960, per capita output in 
Arab countries was higher than that of the three Tigers. The latter were, however, more advanced 
in terms of years of education, with a difference in educational attainment of around three years. 
Over  the  period  1960-1992,  the  difference  in  educational  attainment  actually  doubled,  to  six 
years. Not surprisingly, GNP per worker in Arab countries dropped to less than half of that in the 
Republic of Korea. 
<Insert TABLE 17 and 17’: GDP per person employed (1980=100)> 
At the sectoral level, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) provides 
comparative data for the industrial sector. Industrial labor productivity in the region (proxied by 
the organization's North Africa and West Asia region) was estimated in the early 1990s to be 
roughly the same as in 1970 (when it had been close to European and Japanese levels). In the face 
of  rising  productivity  elsewhere,  this  has  meant  a  significant  relative  decline.  According  to 
UNIDO, Arab industrial labor productivity per worker fell as a percentage of the North American 
level in constant 1985 dollars from 32 per cent in 1970 to 25 per cent in 1980 and 19 per cent in 
1990. It is noteworthy that the decline took place after the oil boom, which started in 1974, after 
an investment of $2,000 billion in gross fixed-capital formation by 1992, and after a massive 
expansion in educational systems at all levels. 
Low returns to education 
Rates  of  return  to  education  give  synthetically  a  measure  of  the  net  benefits  associated  with 
investment in further education. Costs and benefits from that investment depend on the increased 
earnings obtained in the labour market when the individual attains a higher level of education. 
Expected wages represent the returns to education and they establish a link between labor market 
prospects and schooling decisions. However, in situations of high unemployment, like the Arab 
region case, education becomes an investment decision subject to uncertainty and expected wages   22 
should be weighted by employment expectations. Both the costs and the benefits of education are 
unsure and the final decision may be completely different from that taken under certainty
7. 
Casual evidence but also survey results seem to show that employment expec tations play a 
nontrivial role in the educational investment decision.  Indeed, holding wages constant, higher 
unemployment in the present makes schooling more attractive because it is less likely that a wage 
is lost. Higher unemployment reduces the opportu nity cost of education. Similarly, higher future 
unemployment reduces the benefits of education and therefore it discourages enrolment. 
In this context, some contributions should be mentioned, though. Nickell (1979) adjusts rates of 
return by introducing u nemployment because “we shall be underestimating the private rate of 
return  to  the  extent  that  the  individual  will  only  be  in  receipt  of  those  earnings  for  some 
proportion  of  the  time  where  the  proportion  is  directly  related  to  schooling”.  Groot  and 
Oosterbeeck  (1992)  estimate  the  effect  of  unemployment  on  the  level  of  rates  of  return  to 
education,  while  Asplund  et  al.  (1996)  reformulate  the  earnings  equation  to  allow  for  the 
introduction of unemployment. In all these cases, when unemployment differentials are taken into 
account, returns to education increase, in general, at all levels. 
The latest compilation of the rate of return to education for a large number of countries in the 
world is provided by Psacharopoulos (1994). The compilation is based on results using one of the 
three  standard  methods  for  estimating  the  rate  of  return  to  education:  the  “full  method”  of 
calculating the rate of return, the “basic Mincer” earnings function, and the “extended” earnings 
function. In this compilation, the results pertaining to the Arab world are both limited in coverage 
and  outdated.  Of  seventy-eight  results  based  on  the  full  method,  only  five  were  for  Arab 
countries. The Arab countries involved were Morocco (with results for 1970); Somalia (1983); 
Sudan (1974); Tunisia (1980); and Yemen (1985). Of sixty-two results based on estimating a 
Mincer earnings function, only three were for Arab countries; Kuwait (with results for 1983); 
Morocco (1970); and Tunisia (1980). 
                                                   
7  Rees  and Mocan  (1997)  has  attempted  to  study  the  effects  of  unemployment  on  different  types  of  schooling 
decisions. The authors use panel data analysis to investigate the role of unemployment in explaining high school 
dropouts.  The  study  find  a  positive  effect  of  unemployment  on  education  participation,  reducing  dropouts. 
Micklewright et. al. (1990) find a positive effect of unemployment on early school leaving while the time series 
analysis  of  Withfield  and  Wilson  (1991)  yields the  opposite  answer  to  the  same  question. Frederiksson  (1997) 
obtains a very small effect of unemployment clearly inferior to the role played by wages in explaining the demand 
for Higher Education. Other papers concerned  with youth living arrangements have also found differing effects 
depending on specifications. Fernandez and Shioji (2000) have proposed a plausible explanation for this diversity of 
findings. According to the authors, unemployment could have two different effects on enrolment decisions. The one, 
called investment effect, works solely through changing the costs and benefits of education. A high current rate of 
unemployment for non-graduates encourages enrolment by lowering the opportunity cost of education. In the same 
way, the expectation of a high rate of unemployment of graduates upon finishing the degree discourages enrolment 
by reducing the benefits of education. Furthermore, given the intertemporal nature of schooling decisions, serial 
correlation in unemployment rates boosts both effects. So long as high rates of unemployment are expected to occur 
in the future following today‟s observed ones, then the investment effect will be at work. Most previous studies 
consider implicitly or explicitly the investment effect. However, given the inconsistency of results, this effect alone 
does not seem to give a sufficient explanation to the empirical relationship between unemployment and enrolment. 
This is why the authors introduce the other type of effect, called wealth effect. Higher unemployment rates will make 
households poorer in general. In the presence of financial market imperfections, investments in education will be 
negatively affected by the lack of income. Thus, unemployment could unambiguously reduce enrolment if the wealth 
effect predominates.   23 
<Insert TABLE 18: The Coefficient on Years of Schooling. Mincerian Rate of Return> 
As  Birdsall  and  O‟Connell  (1999)  have  noted,  “returns  to  education  differ  by  level  more  in 
MENA than in any other region,” with demand for primary grades much lower, due to education 
quality and labor demand, than for secondary and tertiary levels, where graduates have relied on 
rent wages in the public sector for four decades.  
Ali (2003) have provided estimates of the returns to education, at different levels, in a sample of 
six Arab countries: Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman and Yemen. The results at each 
education level are lower than those reported for a typical developing countries; the average rate 
of return for the six considered countries was found to be 7.3 percent below that of the world 
average of about 10 percent. Furthermore, the rate of return to education do not seem to conform 
to the general world pattern; the returns to education tend to increase by level confirming the 
distortions  characterizing  the  education  systems  in  the  region  that  predominantly  show  a 
systematic bias toward higher at the expense of basic education.  
Sectoral demands within the higher grades also contribute to the mismatch of returns to education 
in the  Arab  economies. Traditionally,  Arab  societies value professions  like medicine and law 
above technical and  vocational  sectors,  often looked upon  with  disdain.  Hence, little demand 
exists for funding vocational and technical education.  
2.2. Labor demand considerations 
2.2.1. Structure of Arab Economies 
Input of labor in production process depends upon technology used, and technology used varies 
across  the  industries.  Traditional  agriculture  is  more  labor  intensive  than  the  modern 
manufacturing industries. With the modernization of economy, share of agriculture in workforce 
reduces due to two factors: food demand grows at a much slower pace at high levels of income, 
which moderates the demand for food-grains, and the technology used in agriculture, at higher 
yield levels is much less labor absorbing than traditional agriculture. 
At all Arab countries level agriculture absorbed 34 to 29 per cent of workforce between the years 
1995 and 2005. Thus, the proportion of workers getting work in agriculture came down by 5 
percentage points between 1995 and 2005. The shifts in ability of agriculture to absorb labor are 
more substantial than the average in five countries which represent 56 per cent of workers in the 
Arab region: Yemen, Sudan, Oman, Morocco and Egypt with respectively 10, 8.8, 8.6, 8 and 6.8 
percentage points less in 2005 than in 1995.  
<Insert TABLE 19: Agricultural labor among workers> 
Though, the share of agriculture in the total employment has been declining over the years, the 
path of this decline has been faster than the decline in the share of agriculture in the GDP (2 per 
cent in average between 1995 and 2005). As a result a clear divergence has emerged between the 
shares of primary, secondary and tertiary sectors in employment and output, suggesting thereby 
relatively large intersectoral differences in the per worker productivity.   24 
< Insert TABLE 20: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)> 
The secular decline in the importance of agriculture sector in the overall economic structure is a 
part of economic development. Work Opportunities that are lost in traditional agriculture have to 
be replaced by work opportunities in some other sector. In the normal course it is the secondary 
sectors (manufacturing) that grow much faster than agriculture during transition of an economy. 
However, in the post reform period the growth of manufacturing industries has been constrained 
by competition from imports. Thus, in the medium term, the ability of manufacturing sector to 
replace the work opportunities lost in traditional agriculture is rather limited over the next 5 to 10 
years.  
In  most  Arab countries, the  shift  from a rural agrarian  society to an urban industrial  society 
involved  widespread  social  and  economic  disruption,  unevenly  distributed  employment  and 
sometimes higher unemployment. 
The industrial sector in the Arab Region has been significantly influenced during the last two 
decades by two major factors:  
  Petroleum and gas industries are the main source of national revenues in 13 countries and 
capital for investments in the other sectors of their economies; these vital revenues depend 
on the international oil price fluctuation.  
  The  inherent  weakness  and  slow  growth  rates  of  the  non-petroleum  manufacturing 
industries (Unified Arab Economic Reports, 1993, 1999). 
The  percentage  of  labor  in  extractive  and  in  manufacturing  industries  has  not  increased 
significantly over the decade. It could even be claimed that it has declined due to the increasing 
share  of  the  service  sector.  Furthermore,  as  the  population  has  been  increasing  dramatically, 
industry did not contribute significantly to the creation of new job opportunities. 
2.2.2. Employment generation and productivity growth 
Assume a national production function that is Cobb-Douglas with a constant return to scale: 
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
L is the rate of growth of  employment, 

A is the rate of growth of TFP, 

K  is the rate of 
growth of the capital stock, which depend largely on the national investment rate, and 

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rate  of  growth  of  the  real  wage.  The  rate  of  job  creation  is  then  increased  by  additional 
investment with which labor is complementary and decreased by any growth in the real wage 
firms pay. Also, greater growth in TFP increases job creation as it increases the marginal product 
of labor. 
Therefore, there is a close connection between job growth, capital accumulation, and productivity 
growth.  Insofar  as  an  absence  of  interaction  with  the  world  economy  reduces  total  factor 
productivity growth, it slows not only the rate of growth of aggregated supply but also the growth 
of employment. Similarly, high levels of technological absorptive capacity, facilitated by specific 
types of higher education, are also critical to increasing the growth rate of TFP. 
The  assumption  is  that  aggregated  demand  increases  sufficiently  rapidly  to  absorb  the  new 
output. On the other hand, the growth of real wages, for a given worker productivity, limits the 
additional profitable jobs that the firm can offer. This imply that the substitution of labor for 
capital, which would require lower real wages relative to the cost of capital, is precluded though 
in  principal  this  substitution  would  be  possible.  Such  substitution  would  also  reduce  the 
investment requirement. 
Given the push to increase the female labor force participation rate, and the need to reduce the 
very high current rates of unemployment and/or underemployment, the number of jobs created 
likely will have to increase by more than 3 percent per year for most Arab countries
8. Table 21 
shows some combinations of variables that allows the realization of the desired  employment 
growth rates of 3.5 and 4 percent as a benchmark, and a 2 percent gr owth rate of real wages. In 
this exercise it is assumed that the initial capital output ratio is  3, reflecting the experiences of 
some Arab countries during 1995-2000, and the depreciation rate of the fixed capital stock is 5 
percent per year given that capital stock evolves as follows: 
1 ) 1 (     t t t K I K  , 
where I is investment and is the fixed capital stock depreciation rate. 
As  has  been  documented  in Collins and Bosworth (1996), the  share of  capital in  developing 
countries, the Arab region members being among them, is much higher than the frequently used 
share of 0.3-0.4. The estimated share for the MENA regions was found to be in the range of 0.5-
0.7 (Senhadji, 2000 and Limam et al, 2007). 
< TABLE 21: Alternative Scenarios for Labor Force Absorption> 
The calculations show that with a TFP growth equal to 0.1 percent per year, capital share of 0.5, 
and for employment to grow at 3.5 percent per year, the required investment rate is 34.5 percent, 
dropping to 25.5 percent when TFP growth is 2% and rising to 40.5 percent when TFP growth is 
-0.5 percent. For employment to grow at 4 percent, consistent with the IMF‟s higher labor force 
growth projection in the region, an important increase in the investment rate would be necessary 
(between 27 and 42 percent). 
                                                   
8 A World Bank study argues this increase is 3.5 percent, and another by the IMF concludes that it is 4 percent; 
World Bank (2004) and Dhonte , Bhattacharya and Yousef, (2000)   26 
According to Limam et al (2007), countries such as Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya and Sudan 
had negative TFP growth
9. In these countries, the investment requirements to absorb the rapidly 
growing labor force will be exceptionally high. Even in the case o f the oil exporters of the GCC, 
simple job creation may not be enough; they have to be jobs that nationals are prepared to take. 
Thus there is a need for greater domestic saving to finance investment and/or greater productivity 
growth,  neither  of  which  wil l  be  easy  to  achieve  given  the  deep  political  uncertainty 
characterizing many of the region‟s regimes and uncertainties about the future price of oil. If such 
saving and investment were to materialize, and both capital stock and employment grew more 
quickly, the aggregated output would also increase more rapidly. The last column of table 21 
showed the implied rate of growth of aggregate supply under the various assumptions (5.5 or 6 
percent per year). 
2.2.3. Barriers to investment 
McCall (2004) reviewed private sector investment in some Arab countries (as a principal sub-
group  of  MENA  region)  and  identified  four  significant  barriers  to  private  investment  in  the 
region: 
1.  Lack of ownership diversity   
In most Arab countries, there is a large degree of state ownership of assets. This structure has 
several negative implications on an economy. Direct  consequences include a  slow innovative 
process of government-owned enterprises, the inability for industry to adapt to new trends, slow 
expansion and low technological expertise. Furthermore, state-owned companies are subject to 
government funding, direction and discretion that can hamper growth and transparency. Indeed, 
studies indicated that while investment is necessary for growth, the quality and efficiency of such 
investment is the critical factor. The Arab region has comparable levels of investment and high 
savings growth rates versus other regions, including East Asia, however the quality of investment 
and returns to productivity has lagged. 
The ratio of private investment to public investment is only at 2 in most Arab Countries, versus 6 
in  OECD  countries,  and  5  for  most  of  SE  Asia.  The  high  percentage  of  family  and  public 
ownership is one prohibiting factor. Additionally, the close relationship between banks and the 
government is often cited as a constraint on credit availability and lacks sufficient transparency.  
Moreover,  the  heavy  public  sector  in  the  Arab  region  often  provide  inefficient  and  costly 
services, raising the cost of exports and limiting the returns, and thus diminishes its attractiveness 
to international and domestic private investment. Privatization in these sectors will also help to 
facilitate trade and investment in related sectors, such as tourism and technology sectors. 
                                                   
9  With reference to the  Arab countries, Sala-i-Martin and  Artadi  (2003) point out that low  TFP growth shows 
ineffectiveness of investments due to three fundamental causes: social and political instability; excess of regulations 
and the presence of heavy public intervention discouraging private investments; poor quality of the human capital. 
As expected, these factors affect in the negative both domestic and (more even so) foreign investments.   27 
2.  Insufficient diversification of the economy 
The small size of many of the financial markets is partly due to the lack of both small and large 
diversified  and  regional  companies.  Only  8%  of  Arab  trade  is  conducted  within  the  MENA 
region, highlighting the region‟s dependence on Europe, Asia and North America for many of its 
goods.  Moreover,  as  highlighted  in  the  previous  sections  there  is  an  urgent  need  to  create 
employment, most of which cannot be provided from the oil sector and must come from other 
industries, such as tourism, manufacturing and services. The size of the combined MENA market 
region is 370 million, but the inter trade is quite low, mainly due to a lack of products, as well as 
lack of conducive regional trade agreements. 
In the GCC  states,  over two thirds  of the  population are under 25 years, and 21 percent are 
between 11 and 15 years old. Jobs are urgently needed for the young nationals as the oil sector 
provides relatively few jobs. Growth is historically not sufficient to create new jobs to absorb the 
rapid  expansion  of  the  labor  force.  IMF  studies  indicate  that  in  economies  that  derive  a 
significant share of their income from oil, the large size of the government sector has been the 
overriding problem, stifling private sector growth and making it hard to diversify production. 
Increasing the diversification of the economies as well inter-regional and international trade is a 
must  not  only  due  to  employment  issues  but  also  for  the  Arab  region  to  keep  pace  with  an 
increasingly competitive world market.  
3.  Inadequate transparency and regulation 
Governance  and  transparency  in  the  region  is  varied  and  it  is  difficult  to  generalize  specific 
reforms and policies. However, there are  several  common  qualities that  most  countries  share 
including;  a  general  lack  of  freedoms,  low  transparency  in  business  and  government  polices 
transactions, and a lack of full accountability. This includes proper recourse for transactions by 
both domestic and international parties in a court of law, as well as the formation of parliaments 
and representative governments.  
4.  Underdeveloped capital markets 
In most Arab markets, banks are still overwhelmingly local and lack a pan-Arab presence. There 
tends to be little competition locally, and many banks are still state-owned. Despite the existence 
of private banks, competition is not actively encouraged. Product innovation is low, although this 
is changing in some countries. 
The  corporate  bond  market  is  in  its  infancy  in  most  Arab  countries,  further  hampering  the 
financing  of  corporate  expansion.  This  also  forces  would  be  creditors  into  the  hands  of  the 
banking  system,  which  further enhances the  power of the banking  system and the control  of 
credit by strong state or private banks. Furthermore, the capitalization of the equity markets is 
low, consisting of a limited number of companies, and offer very poor liquidity. High liquidity is 
needed  to attract both large domestic and  international investors.  Efforts to increase the  size, 
liquidity and product offering of the local markets are in progress but are often hampered by 
cumbersome regulations and requirements.   28 
2.2.4. Low capacity to attract FDI 
Over the last ten years,  FDI  have  significantly increased  both  in absolute and relative terms. 
Between 1980 and 2004, FDI flows in the world went from 55 to 648 billion dollars. The highest 
growth rate took place in the second half of the 90s; after which, the flows started decreasing. 
Rates recorded at the end  of the  period under consideration appear, however, to  be  distinctly 
above any  previous ones.  Arab  countries‟ performance,  however, appears to remain distinctly 
below that of many other developing economies or emerging countries. In particular, the growth 
of FDI flows proves to be notably inferior to that recorded in the EU new members or in the big 
rapid growth Asian economies, such as China and India.  
Between 1995 and 2004, the MENA received, on average, FDI for little more than 8 billion US 
dollars, as against 17 billion dollars of the new EU member countries. The MENA received 1,2% 
of the world‟s total flow of FDI, China and India as a whole got 8%, while 25 EU countries got 
around 43%. Moreover, most of the limited FDI flows go only to a handful of countries and 
specific sectors. More than 80 percent  of FDI  stock is concentrated in  five  countries  – Saudi 
Arabia  (34  percent),  Egypt  (22),  Tunisia  (14),  Bahrain  (7)  and  Morocco  (7).  The  same  five 
countries also have the highest average annual FDI flows. In terms of sector distribution, the bulk 
of the region‟s  FDI is directed  predominantly to  petroleum-related and other natural resource 
activities. Some  other  countries  such as Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon have 
witnessed  FDI  inflows  into  various  sectors  such  as  tourism,  banking,  telecommunications, 
manufacturing, and construction. Some of these non-hydrocarbon sector FDI flows were ushered 
by cross-border mergers and acquisitions, particularly of privatized firms. 
At the country level, the flows and stock of FDI remain a small part of the respective economies, 
both in terms of the gross fixed capital formation (5 percent on average – Bahrain 74, Kuwait 1.4 
of FDI stock)) and the gross domestic product (14 on average – 3.9 UAE, Bahrain and Tunisia 
above 20). 
Although  intra-Arab  investment  is  likely  to  be  understated  in  international  FDI  statistics,  it 
comprises a significant proportion of FDI inflows (more than half of the total FDI inflows). In 
some cases intra-Arab investment is considered domestic investment. Private capital flows from 
the  GCC  to  other  MENA  countries  are  a  potentially  significant  source  of  future  private 
investment. High net worth citizens of the GCC states have invested roughly $1.2 trillion (about 
85 percent of their wealth) abroad, mostly in the United States. Also notable is the considerable 
amount of outward FDI flows and stock in the Arab world. Kuwait has a much higher outward 
FDI stock ($1.98bn) than inward FDI stock ($527 mn) as of 2000. Despite their familiarity with 
economic conditions in MENA and willingness to take a fresh look at investment opportunities at 
home, these elites have diverted only a trickle of their wealth back into the Arab world because 
they cannot find ways to invest it productively at home. 
Research  shows  that  there  are  at  least  three  main  reasons  at  the  basis  of  this  relatively  low 
capacity of the MENA in general and Arab countries in particular to attract investments:   29 
1.  The  small  size  of  local  markets  and  the  lack  of  real  economic  integration  inside  the 
MENA.  As  we  shall  shortly  see,  the  economic  dimension  of  the  MENA  is  relatively 
small,  while  trade  integration  among  the  southern  countries  (the  Agadir  agreements 
between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan) is  not yet  strong  enough to enlarge  the 
dimension of the potential market. 
2.  The  second reason  may  be traced back to the  changes in the  scenario  of international 
competition. Eastward EU expansion along with the rapid growth of some big economies 
in  Latin  America,  China  and  India,  have  provided  new  opportunities  for  international 
investors.  
3.  Thirdly,  economic  and  trading  reforms  in  the  MENA  have  been  slow  and  mostly 
insufficient, while restraint of investments along with the inadequacy of its institutional 
and legal framework only add to the low attractive capacity of the region. 
3. Employment Programs and Employment Policies
10 
3.1. Active Labor Market Policies 
The steady rise in unemployment rates in the 1970s and 1980s in Europe has been  variously 
attributed to mismatches between labor skills demanded and supplied, excessive wages vis-à-vis 
productivity  levels,  over-generous  out-of-work  benefits,  and  rigid  institutions.  Among  the 
possible  solutions  was  the  introduction  of  government  policies  to  better  mold  labor  force 
characteristics to changes in demand, to lower firms‟ labor costs directly and to increase job-
search efficiency. These policies have  been  grouped under the  label of  Active  Labor  Market 
Policies (ALMP). 
The  ALMP  reflect  the  increasing  consensus  among  policy  makers  that  actively  assisting  the 
unemployed in job search is preferable to simply providing them with passive income support. 
The danger is, so the argument goes, that reliance on passive income support may reduce work 
incentives and job-search activities and therefore increase the risk of long-term unemployment. 
ALMP are seen by many as the key to minimize these risks. 
Calmfors (1995) distinguishes four basic functions of ALMP: raise output and welfare by putting 
unemployed to work or have them invest in human capital, maintain the size of the effective labor 
force by keeping up competition for available jobs, help to reallocate labor between different sub-
markets, and alleviate the moral-hazard problem of unemployment insurance.  
ALMP may eliminate mismatch in the labor market, promote more active search behavior on the 
part of the job seekers and have a screening function because they substitute for regular work 
experience  in  reducing  employer  uncertainty  about  the  employability  of  job  applicants. 
Placements in labor market programs may provide an alternative work test to the eligibility of 
unemployment benefits, since some of those who are not genuinely interested in work will prefer 
to lose registration rather than to participate in a program. An adverse side effect of ALMP is that 
                                                   
10  I  highly  recommend  the  chapter  prepared  for  the  Handbook  of  Labor  Economics,  Volume  III,  by  Heckman, 
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workers  are  locked-in  training  and  job-creation  programs:  because  of  their  participation  they 
reduce their search intensity. 
Calmfors  (1994)  distinguishes  a  number  of  indirect  effects  which  are  also  important  when 
assessing the effectiveness of ALMP. First there are displacement effects since jobs created by 
one program are at the expense of other jobs. Then there are deadweight effects because labor 
market  programs  subsidize  hiring  that  would  have  occurred  anyway  in  the  absence  of  the 
program. There are also substitution effects because jobs created for a certain category of workers 
replace jobs for other categories because relative wage costs have changed. Finally, there are the 
effects of taxation required to finance the programs on the behavior of everyone in society. 
In  line  with  the  distinction  between  micro  and  macro  effects  there  are  two  main  types  of 
evaluation studies of ALMP (Martin and Grubb, 2001). The first type uses micro data to measure 
the impact of program participation on individuals‟ employment and earnings. The second type 
uses  aggregate  data  to  measure  the  net  effects  of  programs  on  aggregate  employment  and 
unemployment.  Micro  studies  have  the  advantage  of  a  very  large  number  of  observations. 
Drawbacks  are  the  selection  bias  and  the  fact  that  they  provide  only  estimates  of  partial-
equilibrium effects. Macro studies are few. Drawbacks of macro studies are that they are based 
on few observations, they often lump together various types of training and job creation schemes 
and they have to deal with a simultaneity bias. 
There are many evaluation studies. A lot of them are done in Sweden, a country that has used 
ALMP extensively. Heckman et al. (1999) give a detailed overview of several micro-econometric 
evaluation studies. They conclude that labor market programs have at best a modest impact on 
participants‟  labor  market  prospects.  Furthermore,  there  is  considerable  heterogeneity  in  the 
impact of these programs, so for some groups of workers the programs are more effective than 
for  other  groups  of  workers.  Finally,  when  programs  are  implemented  on  a  large  scale 
displacement  and  general  equilibrium  effects  may  be  sizeable.  This  means  that  without 
incorporating them in a macro framework micro treatment effect evaluations will provide poor 
guides to public policy.  
Calmfors, Forslund and Hemstrom (2001) conclude that  the evidence  on the  effectiveness of 
Swedish ALMP is rather disappointing. Labor market retraining for example has no or negative 
employment effects.  Martin and Grubb (2001) draw  similar  conclusions  in their  overview  on 
what  works  and  what  does  not  work  among  ALMP  in  OECD  countries.  They  conclude  for 
example  that  subsidies  to  employment  and  direct  job  creation  have  been  of  little  success  in 
helping unemployed get permanent jobs. Kluve and Schmidt (2002) also present an overview of 
evaluation studies concluding that job search assistance can be useful, private sector subsidies are 
better than public sector programs and training programs can help to improve the labor market 
prospects of unemployed workers.   31 
3.2. Programs and Policies Aiming to Enhance Employment Opportunities of Arab Youth
11 
Employment programs can be divided into three main categories:  
(1) Interventions  which  impact  the  supply  side  of  the  labor  market,  e.g.,  education  and 
training programs catering for young unemployed and displaced workers.  
(2) Interventions seeking to impact the demand side, e.g. creating employment opportunities 
through supporting  employers; increasing  opportunities  for self-employment and small 
businesses,  and  using  job  nationalization,  wage  subsidies,  business  incentives,  micro-
credit, public works and services programs.   
(3) Interventions intending to improve the functioning and monitoring of the labor market, 
e.g., increasing job market information and employment database, providing job search 
assistance,  supporting  professional  guidance,  employment  offices,  and  enhancing  the 
coordination between the various employment promotion schemes.  
The  abovementioned  programs  have  been  adopted  to  varying  degrees  by  the  different  Arab 
countries.  Some  of  these  programs  are  comprehensive  and  incorporate  multiple  training  and 
employment activities, such as the Social Development Fund in Egypt; the Social Development 
Fund in Yemen; and the Employment Fund in Jordan.  Other countries represent landmarks in 
certain components of employment policies such as the programs aiming at developing business 
and entrepreneurship initiatives in Jordan, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates; and policies 
aimed at improving labor  market information and  strengthening the role  of placement offices 
such as in Tunisia. 
3.2.1. Programs aiming mainly to develop the supply side:  
Improving technical education and vocational training (TEVT):  
New programs have been introduced, such as “dual-system” (programs which combine training 
and apprenticeships); joint public-private programs; and school-to-work programs (e.g., school 
enterprises and internships).  However, in many Arab countries most of the vocational education 
is carried out at secondary school levels.   Arab governments are the main providers of the TVET 
services, expect for Lebanon where the responsibility lies with the private sector.  The private 
sector is increasingly contributing to this domain although its contribution has been modest in 
may countries (e.g., Egypt).  TEVT has received, however, heavy cooperation and coordination 
from the business organizations in some countries (e.g., in Bahrain).  
Outstanding attempts to upgrade the quality of TEVT programs in the region have been cited in 
many specialized reports, among which is a new technique, DACUM (Design A Curriculum).  It 
is used by the Public Authority for Applied Education and Training (PAAET), the main provider 
of vocational education and training in Kuwait, to bridge the gap between the demand and supply 
sides of the labor market in skills and know-how.  
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Also significant developments are taking place in the TEVT system of Yemen.  The Ministry of 
Technical Education and Vocational Training (MTEVT), through technical collaboration with the 
ILO, overhauled the Yemeni TEVT system.   
The  Skill  Development  Fund  (SDF)  and  several  joint  publich-private  collaborations  were 
established  and  the  government  is  gradually  expanding  the  capacities  of  the  various  training 
institutions.  
Among the most important employment initiatives in the region is the Mubarak-Kohl Initiative 
(MKI), an apprenticeship scheme, launched in 1991 in order to initiate a structural change in the 
Egyptian vocational education and training system (VET).  MKI is based on joint financial and 
technical collaborations of public and private organizations in order to provide intensive technical 
training programs to a limited number of trainees. 
Similar projects are also taking in Saudi Arabia.  The Saudi Vocational Training Administration 
launched the National System for Joint Training (NSJT) in cooperation with the private sector.  It 
provides mostly enterprise-based training.  
The Tunisian government, being the body responsible for the TVET system, has created since the 
early 1990s many institutions to lift the role of TVET in employment.   
The  Tunisian  government  has  also  taken  several  measures  to  improve  TVET  in  the  country 
including  legislating  training  levy  to  support  vocational  training,  performing  apprenticeship 
training  through  training  contracts,  building  up  vocational  formation  map,  and  vocational 
formation of women in rural areas.  
Developing entrepreneurial attitudes and skills:  
One of the  most  significant initiatives in this  domain  is INJAZ; a youth initiative  funded  by 
USAID that is  now  operating in several Arab  countries,  e.g. Jordan,  Kuwait, Egypt, Bahrain, 
Lebanon, Oman,  Palestine and Qatar. It aims at  creating  entrepreneurial  culture and  fostering 
business  attitudes,  creative  and  critical  thinking,  problem-solving  and  interpersonal 
communication  skills  within  the  youth.    It  also  seeks  to  prepare  an  innovative  and  qualified 
generation  of  workers,  in  order  to  fulfill  the  private  sector’s  growing  needs  for  better  labor 
quality. 
Tax exemptions and Training Subsidies:  
Some Arab governments have established business tax relief systems in order to encourage the 
participation  of  the  private  sector  in  enterprise-based  training  programs  and  employment 
promotion  schemes.    For  example,  Bahrain  uses  “Training  Participation  Levy  schemes”  to 
finance  training,  while  compensatory  incentives  are  proposed  to  encourage  enterprise-based 
training in Egypt.  
Informal training:  
The Somali Education Incentives for Girls and Young Men (SEIGYM), supported by the Africa 
Educational Trust (AET), uses a “voucher  system”  which  encourages  disadvantaged  youth to   33 
gain essential reading and work skills.  It uses a variety of informal education and training to give 
school dropouts a second chance to have a craft.  
3.2.2. Programs targeting the demand side of the labor market 
These include programs of self-employment, and enterprise development, micro-credit schemes, 
job subsides and job reservation schemes.  
Micro-enterprise development and Programs of Self-Employment: 
The Social Fund for Development (SFD) in Egypt, established in 1991, encourages the initiation 
of  small  businesses,  especially  among  youth,  through  the  provision  of  soft  loans,  as  well  as 
training, technical support, guidance and supervision.  Another Egyptian program, The Desert 
Development Program, aims at reducing unemployment through enabling Egyptians to build a 
livelihood in lands transformed from desert into agricultural land.  
In the United Arab Emirates, Mohammed Bin Rashid Established for Young Business Leaders 
encourages and  facilitates  the  development of local businesses and  entrepreneurial activity in 
Dubai  through  assisting,  training  and  supporting  SMEs  run  by  UAE  nationals.    The  Social 
Development Fund in Yemen has also outstanding achievement in the job creation domain, skill 
development, poverty alleviation and  improving the quality of life particularly in rural areas.  
Jordan has numerous schemes which support private business and investments.  Examples of the 
Jordanian  programs  aiming  at  facilitating  the  establishment  of  new  businesses  and  providing 
support  to  start-up  enterprises  are  the  information  and  Communication  Technology  Incubator 
which was launched by the Higher Council for Science and Technology, and “Empretec” which 
is UNCTAD’s integrated capacity-building program promoting the creation of sustainable SME 
support structures to help promising entrepreneurs build internationally competitive SMEs.  
In  Oman,  SANAD,  a  self-employment  government  program,  focuses  on  enhancing  business 
opportunities for Omani nationals, particularly skilled youth.  It is also actively contributing to 
the Omanisation of the private sector.  
In Tunisia, the FNE 21-21 and BTS established in 1993 and 1997, respectively, to facilitate the 
creation  of small  business especially for the jobless.  In addition, the central bank of Tunisia 
manages the National Fund for the promotion of small craft businesses (FONAPRAM).  
Access to credit: 
In  the  United  Arab  Emirates,  Al  Tomooh,  a  small  business  financial  scheme  established  by 
Emirates  Bank,  provides  easy  access  to  funding  for  small  national  enterprises  owned  by 
nationals.    A  variety  of  other  schemes  are  available  in  Jordan  (AMIR  and  the  Jordan  Loan 
Guarantee Corporation), Tunisia (the Tunisian Bank for Solidarity, BTS, and the National Fund 
for Employment, FNE 21-21).  Kuwait (the Industrial Bank of  Kuwait’s subsidized loans for 
establishing  small  specialized  businesses);  and  some  other  Arab  countries  among  which  are 
micro-finance  programs, loan guarantee programs,  venture  capital  funds  and long-term assets 
procurement schemes.    34 
Public works programs (PWP): 
These programs are an important tool for transferring income to the poor segments of society, 
and  for  providing  gainful  jobs.  They  however  do  not  improve  the  employment  prospects  of 
program participants in the long run.  In Egypt, PWP established in 1991, is part of the Social 
Fund  for  Development  (SFD)  program.    Its  aim  is  to  provide  jobs  through  labor-intensive 
infrastructure projects in rural areas.   Similarly, the SDF in Yemen since its creation in 1997 and 
until 2004, has generated 10.3 million temporary and 14.5 thousand permanent jobs.  
It is estimated that PWP employs 0.4 percent of the labor force in Egypt, 0.1 percent in Yemen, 
0.6 percent in Morocco, 2.3 percent in Algeria and 2.4 percent in Tunisia (World Bank, 2004).  
Youth are the primary beneficiaries of these programs.  
Employment and wage subsidies 
In Tunisia employment/wage subsidies represent more than 50 percent of the ALMP cost.  Wage-
supplements  are  also  heavily  used  in  many  GCC  countries  to  encourage  the  employment  of 
natives in the private sector.  
Job-Nationalization and Job-Reservation Schemes:  
In many Arab countries, notably the GCC countries, labor nationalization programs which aim at 
replacing foreign workers with nationals through market-based and mandatory rules, are used.  
3.2.3. Scheme intending to improving the functioning and monitoring of the labor market 
Higher councils, committees and taskforces: 
Recently,  Bahrain  established  the  Vocational  Education  and  Training-Skills  for  Work  Task 
Force.  In Jordan, the Vocational Training Corporation (VTC) is a main player in the Jordanian 
training sector.  Also, the Ministry of Education, the VTC, Ministry of Labor and other local and 
international  organizations  are  actively  developing  the  TEVT  sector.    Similar  bodies  are 
established  in  Saudi  Arabia:  the  Work  Force  Council,  and  in  Egypt:  the  Higher  Council  for 
Human Resources Development.  Tunisia has organized a job insertion of young graduates in the 
labor market.  
Setting occupational standards: 
Linking  jobs  to  specific  skills  will  not  only  break  the  vicious  cycle  between  overstated  job 
specification  and  over-education,  but  will  also  improve  the  employment  prospects  of  young 
graduates.  
The Saudi Vocational Training Administration in collaboration with the private sector launched a 
scheme  to  establish  approved  national  standards  for  occupational  skill  requirements.    This 
initiative seeks to help educational and training programs in matching their programs’ output with 
labor  market  demands.    Egypt’s  Higher  Council  for  Human  Resources  Development  also  is 
establishing  a  system  of  approving  national  standards  and  issuing  licenses  for  various 
occupational skill levels.    35 
Job-search assistance/employment services 
One of the landmarks in the Arab countries in the field of employment services is the Tunisian 
National Employment Agency and Independent Work (ANETI), established in 1993 and changes 
name in 2003.  Its main role through its 90 employment offices is to convey job information 
between  employers  and  job  candidates.    In  a  given  year,  more  than  300,000  job  applicants 
register at least once in the ANETI offices, and more than 7 million use its internet services for 
consultation.      In  Egypt,  the  Ministry  of  Manpower  and  Emigration  is  actively  working  to 
improve job-placement offices.    
Networking: 
An empowering technique, especially for young entrepreneurs, is gaining access to business and 
other relevant networks which provide information and support.   Examples of these networks 
include the Young Arab Leaders (YAL) Network, a Pan-Arab initiative launched in 2004 to grow 
a base of five hundred Arab leaders in the field of business, government, civil society, journalism, 
arts and academia.  Another equally important initiative is the Young Entrepreneurs Organization 
(YEO), an international NGO established in 1987 and runs in several Arab countries.  
Other national entrepreneurial network include Riyada in Dubai that is a monthly networking 
event  which  aims  at  promoting  and  encouraging  entrepreneurship  and  increasing  knowledge 
dissemination for local entrepreneurs.  
< TABLE 22: Expenditures on Active and Passive Labor Market Programs in Selected MENA 
Countries, 2003> 
4. Conclusion 
The Arab world is confronted with an increasing pressure coming from the supply side of the 
labor  market,  generated  principally  by  the  unemployed  persons  looking  for  a  job,  the  new 
entrants on the labor market and the expected increase of the women labor force participation 
rate.  This  pressure  is  compounded  by  structural  considerations  relating  to  the  slow  labor 
productivity growth, low demand for skills, slow and erratic domestic investment growth, low 
attractiveness  of  foreign  direct  investment  and  high  dependency  on  the  dynamics  of  the 
international oil market as well as labor migration. 
The high youth unemployment is certainly the most striking manifestation of the development 
crisis plaguing almost all Arab countries. It represents the major challenge. There are variations 
on the causes and the dimensions of the problem, and each country of this part of the world has 
its specificity that should be taken into account when addressing the unemployment question.  
As  such,  in  GCC  countries,  youth  unemployment  is  fundamentally  a  supply  problem  as  the 
products of the educational and training systems do not respond to the needs of the labor market. 
In  the  more  diversified  economies,  without  neglecting  the  supply  side  considerations  linked 
among other to the mismatch between the quality of labor and the requirements of the emerging 
and fragile private sector, the basic problem seems to be a shortage of demand due to a slowdown 
of the growth process or/and a non-employment-friendly pattern of growth. Consequently, for the 
first group, the main issue is ensuring that entering cohorts of young nationals are able to find   36 
appropriate jobs that match their skills and pay acceptable wages. For the second group, the main 
issue is creating enough jobs to accommodate entering cohorts. 
Several specialists of development issues in Arab countries underline the non-existence among 
the  economic  policy  leaders  of  a  forward-looking  strategic  type  of  thinking,  which  aims  at 
managing  the  future  labor  market  conditions  on  the  basis  of  a  strategic  intelligence  matrix 
continually augmented by a systematic investigation and compilation of information relating to 
all the  segments  of the  labor  markets. Consequently,  we  cannot  expect the  development of a 
complete strategic plan aimed at identifying the features of an economic arrangement that can 
ensure a steady pace of development to create more than 100 million jobs in less than one decade. 
The  lack  of  prediction  and  forecast  management  in  general  severely  hampers  the  rational 
planning which sets precise perceptions for the methods and terms of the development in these 
Arab economies. 
In  contrast  with  the  relative  attention  paid  to  macro  aspects,  there  is  insufficient  empirical 
detailed evidence on the topic of labor market micro analysis, market selection process and firm 
productivity within this area of the world, the major constraint being the availability, accessibility 
and dissemination of labor force surveys and firm-level data. Confidentiality is most often used 
against accessibility of microdata and few Arab countries have a clear microdata dissemination 
policy. Shortage in data and its coverage necessitates the need for more effort to be done on data 
collection and dissemination which enables researchers to draw concrete inferences on the status 
and dynamic of youth unemployment in the Arab countries.    37 
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TABLE 1:  Population and Fertility Rate in Arab countries (thousands) 
       
                     Growth (per cent)  Fertility Rate 




2005  1950-1955  2000-2005 
Arab countries                               
Algeria  8753  13746  18811  25291  30463  32854  114,9  74,7  7,28  2,53 
Bahrain  116  220  347  493  672  727  199,1  109,5  6,97  2,47 
Comoros  173  275  387  527  699  798  123,7  106,2  6,33  4,89 
Djibouti  62  162  340  558  715  793  448,4  133,2  7,8  5,09 
Egypt  21834  35285  43860  55673  67285  74033  100,9  68,8  6,56  3,29 
Iraq  5340  10112  14093  18515  25075  28807  163,9  104,4  7,3  4,83 
Jordan  472  1623  2225  3254  4972  5703  371,4  156,3  7,38  3,53 
Kuwait  152  744  1375  2143  2230  2687  804,6  95,4  7,21  2,38 
Lebanon  1443  2390  2698  2741  3398  3577  87,0  32,6  5,74  2,32 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  1029  1986  3043  4334  5306  5853  195,7  92,3  6,87  3,03 
Mauritania  825  1262  1609  2030  2645  3069  95,0  90,7  6,3  5,79 
Morocco  8953  15310  19527  24696  29231  31478  118,1  61,2  7,18  2,76 
Oman  456  747  1187  1843  2442  2567  160,3  116,3  7,2  3,78 
Occupied Palestinian Territory  1005  1096  1476  2154  3150  3702  46,9  150,8  7,38  5,57 
Qatar  25  111  229  467  606  813  816,0  255,0  6,97  3,03 
Saudi Arabia  3201  5745  9604  16379  21484  24573  200,0  155,9  7,18  4,09 
Somalia   2264  3601  6487  6674  7012  8228  186,5  26,8  7,25  6,43 
Sudan  9190  14699  19970  26066  32902  36233  117,3  81,4  6,67  4,45 
Syrian Arab Republic  3495  6378  8978  12843  16813  19043  156,9  112,1  7,2  3,47 
Tunisia  3530  5127  6454  8219  9563  10102  82,8  56,5  6,93  2 
United Arab Emirates  70  225  1015  1868  3247  4496  1350,0  343,0  6,97  2,53 
Yemen   4316  6327  8197  12086  17937  20975  89,9  155,9  8,2  6,2 
Arab Countries  76704  127171  171912  228854  287847  321111  124,1  86,8  7,0  3,8 
                                
Less developed regions  1706698  2688915  3359755  4130947  4892218  5253484  96,9  56,4  6,17  2,9 
World  2519470  3696588  4442295  5279519  6085572  6464750  76,3  45,5  5,02  2,65 
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 
Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 
2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp, 16 October 2006; 7:01:38 AM.            43 
TABLE 2: Percentage aged less than 15 (per cent) 
 
   1950  1970  1980  1990  2000  2005 
Arab countries                   
Algeria  40,1  48,4  45,9  43,1  34,1  29,6 
Bahrain  42,3  46  34,6  31,5  28,2  27,1 
Comoros  43,5  46,9  48  46,9  43  42 
Djibouti  46,8  45,8  45,3  44  42,8  41,5 
Egypt  39,7  41,4  41,4  41  35,9  33,6 
Iraq  40,5  47,4  47,1  44,6  42,6  41 
Jordan  45,7  45,9  49,4  46,8  39,3  37,1 
Kuwait  36,2  43,4  40,3  36,6  26  24,4 
Lebanon  34,3  42,4  38,1  35,4  30,6  28,6 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  42  44,9  46,6  43,7  32,8  30,1 
Mauritania  43,8  43,2  43,9  43,9  43,3  43 
Morocco  44,4  47,6  43  39,7  33,4  31,1 
Oman  42,3  47,8  45,6  44,1  36,4  34,5 
Occupied Palestinian Territory  45,7  45  47,6  46,7  46,5  45,5 
Qatar  42,3  36,7  32,4  27,7  26,2  21,7 
Saudi Arabia  42  44,5  44,3  41,6  39,6  37,3 
Somalia   41,3  45,5  46,8  45,4  44  44,1 
Sudan  43,8  44,3  44,9  43,3  40,5  39,2 
Syrian Arab Republic  41,5  47,8  49,1  48,1  40,3  36,9 
Tunisia  38,9  46,3  42  38  30,3  26 
United Arab Emirates  42,3  34,7  28,6  30  24,6  22 
Yemen   42,3  48,6  50  51,7  48,2  46,4 
Arab Countries  41,3  45,1  44,3  42,7  37,8  35,5 
                    
Less developed regions  30  32,6  27,4  26,6  22,4  21 
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TABLE 3 : Adult (15+) economic activity rate 
Country   Year  Total  Men  Women     Source 
Algeria  1977  36.7  71.8  3.8     Population census 
   1985  38.1  69.4  8.5     Labor force survey 
   1996  44.9  77.5  11.8     Labor force survey 
Bahrain  1985  45.5  73.5  17.2     Official estimates 
   1987  45.9  73.6  17.8     Official estimates 
   2001  65.7  86  35.5     Population census 
Comoros  1980  53.5  81.7  27.1     Population census 
Egypt  1976  43.9  80.7  6.4     Population census 
   1986  44.4  77.8  9.8     Population census 
   1995  47.9  73.4  21.6     Labor force survey 
   2002  43.2  68.7  18.4     Labor force survey 
Iraq  1977  48.6  80.2  15.8     Population census 
   1987  43.9  75.3  10.5     Population census 
Jordan  1976  39.9  71.7  8.3     Labor force survey 
   1991  41.3  69  11.5     Labor force survey 
   1993  43.7  72.5  12.7     Labor force survey 
Kuwait  1970  57.4  87.4  10     Population census 
   1980  60.5  85.8  20.2     Population census 
   1985  62.5  83.2  31.1     Population census 
   1995  68  83.6  43.5     Population census 
Lebanon  1975  44.6  73.8  15.4     Official estimates 
   1997  46.8           Official estimates 
Libya  1973  45.7  78  6.5     Population census 
Mauritania  1975  48.5  94.6        Population census 
Morocco  1971  45.6  80  12.6     Population census 
   1982  47.2  78.3  16.9     Population census 
   1990  49.6  74.9  25.1     Labor force survey 
   1995  52  75.4  30.5     Labor force survey 
   2003  51.9  77.4  27.3     Labor force survey 
Oman  2003  55.3  76.9  24.6     Population census 
Qatar  1986  75.5  93  27.5     Population census 
   1997  72.9  89.2  33.4     Population census 
   2004  77.1  91.7  40.6     Population census 
Saudi Arabia  1992  53.6  80  14.5     Population census 
Somalia  1975  64.6  92.7  37.5     Official estimates 
Sudan  1973  54.9  89.1  21.6     Population census 
   1983  57.3  85.2  31     Population census 
   1996  51.3  74.7  29.1     Official estimates 
Syria  1981  43.8  79.1  7.1     Population census 
   1999  50.9  80.7  20     Labor force survey 
   2003  47.5  75.3  18.7     Labor force survey 
Tunisia  1975  51.7  83.6  19.5     Population census 
   1984  50.8  79  21.9     Population census 
   1997  48.6  73.4  23.7     Labor force survey 
   2005  46.3  68.6  24.4     Labor force survey 
United Arab Emirates  1975  73.3  93.3  10.2     Population census 
   1995  75.2  92.2  31.3     Population census 
                      45 
(TABLE 3 continued) 
Country   Year  Total  Men  Women     Source 
Canada  1980  61.2  74.5  48.4     Labor force survey 
   1990  67  75.9  58.4     Labor force survey 
   2002  66.9  73.3  60.7     Labor force survey 
France  1980  55.8  69.1  43.5     Labor force survey 
   1990  55.9  65.9  46.7     Labor force survey 
   2002  55.7  62.9  49.1     Labor force survey 
Portugal  1980  61.6  79.6  46.2     Labor force survey 
   1990  58.9  71.7  47.5     Labor force survey 
   2002  61.8  70.2  54     Labor force survey 
United Kingdom  1980  61.1  74.4  48.7     Labor force survey 
   1990  63  74.4  52.4     Labor force survey 
   2002  62.6  70.5  54.9     Labor force survey 
United States  1980  60.8  73  49.6     Labor force survey 
   1990  64.4  73.5  56     Labor force survey 
   2001  63.2  69.6  57.2     Labor force survey 
 
TABLE 4 : Labor Force and Population Growth rates 
 
  
Labor Force Average 







   Per cent  Period  Per cent  Year 
Algeria  3,2  1982-2004  11.8  1996  2,3 
Bahrain  3,8  1981-2005  35.5  2001  3,0 
Comoros  2,2  1980-1991  27.1  1980  2,9 
Egypt  2,6  1980-2003  18.4  2002  2,1 
Kuwait  2,8  1980-1995  43.5  1995  2,7 
Morocco  3,4  1982-2003  27.3  2003  1,9 
Qatar  3,1  1986-1997  40.6  2004  5,2 
Syrian Arab Republic  4,2  1983-2003  18.7  2003  3,1 
Tunisia  2,6  1980-2005  24.4  2005  1,8 
United Arab Emirates  6,0  1980-1995  31.3  1995  6,1 
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TABLE 5: Dependency Ratios 
   1950  1970  1980  1990  2000  2005 
Arab countries                   
Algeria  80  110  99  87  62  52 
Bahrain  82  94  58  51  45  43 
Comoros  89  98  102  98  84  81 
Djibouti  95  92  90  87  83  80 
Egypt  74  84  83  82  68  62 
Iraq  78  102  100  91  84  78 
Jordan  102  96  111  100  73  68 
Kuwait  64  82  71  61  38  35 
Lebanon  71  90  77  70  60  56 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  87  91  96  86  57  52 
Mauritania  85  85  88  89  87  87 
Morocco  90  107  89  77  61  56 
Oman  102  94  104  100  100  94 
Occupied Palestinian Territory  83  103  92  85  63  59 
Qatar  84  62  50  40  38  30 
Saudi Arabia  83  91  89  78  73  67 
Somalia   78  94  99  93  87  88 
Sudan  89  89  91  87  78  75 
Syrian Arab Republic  85  104  108  103  76  67 
Tunisia  80  100  84  74  56  47 
United Arab Emirates  84  61  43  45  35  30 
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TABLE 6: Proportion of Women in the Labor Force per age cohort (per cent) 
 
   1980  2005 
   15+  15-24  15-64  25-34  25-54  35-54  55-64  65+  15+  15-24  15-64  25-34  25-54  35-54  55-64  65+ 
Algeria  25,5  31,5  25,2  22,8  22,3  21,9  24,9  39,5  44,2  42,7  44,5  49,7  46,1  43,0  34,0  28,0 
Bahrain  11,9  22,5  12,1  11,8  9,5  6,5  2,1  0,6  23,0  37,7  23,4  31,2  22,8  18,3  2,7  1,4 
Comoros  76,0  81,3  76,7  70,6  74,4  77,6  75,5  60,2  66,9  71,3  68,1  68,6  66,8  65,0  66,0  37,4 
Djibouti  72,2  73,3  72,4  70,1  72,1  73,7  71,8  62,0  64,7  66,0  65,4  65,5  65,8  66,1  60,4  43,3 
Egypt  23,7  15,9  23,3  21,6  27,0  30,3  17,7  33,7  27,8  42,5  28,0  31,6  26,3  22,5  12,2  16,6 
Iraq  19,8  24,5  20,2  23,3  19,1  15,3  12,4  5,7  25,3  30,1  25,9  30,4  25,2  20,2  13,4  4,5 
Jordan  21,8  34,2  22,2  22,2  18,0  14,8  14,3  8,3  32,4  40,6  32,7  35,2  31,1  27,1  20,7  14,2 
Kuwait  14,6  23,0  14,6  17,6  13,4  9,3  5,3  6,0  34,0  58,3  34,2  41,6  32,5  25,2  11,7  2,7 
Lebanon  39,6  35,3  40,3  52,0  45,4  40,5  20,6  18,8  43,6  31,3  45,3  54,6  52,8  51,4  20,4  12,4 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  18,4  28,7  18,5  18,6  16,0  13,9  10,9  12,2  37,3  32,2  38,2  49,9  43,6  38,0  13,3  9,0 
Mauritania  68,3  71,2  69,4  69,8  69,9  69,9  59,5  41,6  67,7  68,5  68,8  67,6  69,3  71,0  64,9  44,0 
Morocco  27,3  35,0  27,8  26,3  26,0  25,8  14,0  13,1  34,1  34,1  34,7  37,1  36,2  35,5  21,9  16,1 
Oman  17,2  22,4  17,2  15,6  15,7  15,8  16,4  19,8  19,6  28,7  19,7  23,1  18,2  13,9  10,2  11,2 
Qatar  9,5  5,2  9,6  10,4  10,9  11,4  3,3  2,3  15,9  6,7  16,0  19,6  17,8  16,5  3,9  3,9 
Saudi Arabia  8,6  6,9  8,8  10,7  9,7  8,5  3,5  2,6  17,9  15,5  18,1  25,0  19,6  15,2  4,3  2,8 
Somalia  67,8  80,0  69,2  63,3  64,8  66,2  51,8  40,0  64,6  75,4  65,9  62,2  62,6  63,0  49,0  32,9 
Sudan  36,8  41,6  36,7  32,2  34,1  35,7  38,6  38,1  33,0  39,3  33,1  32,5  31,4  30,4  30,8  30,5 
Syrian Arab Republic  30,4  38,1  30,4  27,3  27,4  27,4  23,3  28,1  44,2  50,2  44,4  43,0  42,3  41,6  32,6  35,4 
Tunisia  23,3  33,0  23,7  24,2  19,7  16,3  13,9  10,2  38,1  60,3  39,2  43,3  35,5  29,7  17,5  9,7 
United Arab Emirates  5,3  6,2  5,3  5,7  5,2  4,3  2,8  3,3  15,5  23,2  15,5  18,6  14,6  11,1  4,5  3,1 
West Bank and Gaza Strip  14,3  9,8  14,3  14,1  16,3  18,2  14,8  17,3  15,1  12,6  15,1  16,2  16,0  15,8  13,6  17,9 
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TABLE 7: Women Economic Activity Rate (age group +15, per cent) 
 
   1980  2005 
   15+  15-24  15-64  25-34  25-54  35-54  55-64  65+  15+  15-24  15-64  25-34  25-54  35-54  55-64  65+ 
Algeria  19,0  19,2  19,8  21,5  20,6  19,8  17,8  9,2  35,7  29,3  38,0  48,6  44,9  41,9  21,9  6,2 
Bahrain  17,0  18,4  17,7  26,4  18,8  11,1  2,3  0,5  29,2  22,0  30,7  45,2  36,4  31,0  3,4  0,6 
Comoros  64,6  59,0  66,1  68,8  71,4  73,6  63,1  37,6  57,7  50,5  59,5  68,2  65,9  63,8  57,1  24,8 
Djibouti  57,5  48,3  58,9  64,9  66,5  68,0  54,4  27,8  53,0  43,8  54,8  63,5  62,8  62,2  48,2  21,4 
Egypt  17,2  8,4  17,4  15,8  23,5  29,7  14,8  14,7  20,1  17,8  21,6  31,0  25,9  22,2  9,0  2,6 
Iraq  15,0  14,8  15,9  23,1  17,9  13,7  7,9  2,2  20,0  18,5  21,0  30,2  24,1  18,6  8,6  1,8 
Jordan  16,0  17,9  16,9  22,0  17,2  13,9  9,5  2,6  27,5  23,5  28,9  38,7  33,9  29,3  13,2  4,0 
Kuwait  18,7  13,1  19,3  28,9  23,8  18,1  5,4  0,9  49,0  29,9  50,4  71,8  60,7  50,1  13,6  0,6 
Lebanon  28,7  19,8  31,0  45,2  40,5  36,9  17,7  5,4  32,4  18,8  35,7  53,2  46,7  42,6  14,3  4,4 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  18,0  17,7  18,7  21,7  20,3  19,0  11,1  4,7  32,1  19,9  33,9  50,1  44,9  40,1  13,7  4,2 
Mauritania  55,9  49,2  57,7  63,7  64,2  64,5  50,1  24,5  54,3  46,7  56,5  63,6  63,6  63,5  49,1  23,0 
Morocco  21,2  23,3  22,4  24,3  23,1  22,1  13,5  5,0  26,8  22,2  28,7  35,2  33,7  32,6  15,9  4,7 
Oman  16,1  12,8  16,7  23,9  20,3  17,1  9,2  4,1  22,7  15,8  23,6  35,4  30,9  26,1  8,9  3,6 
Qatar  19,4  5,6  19,8  29,1  29,0  28,8  7,5  2,4  36,2  5,6  36,9  46,3  49,2  51,7  12,1  3,6 
Saudi Arabia  8,7  4,3  9,2  17,1  13,3  10,0  2,3  0,9  17,6  7,7  18,5  31,2  26,2  21,6  3,5  1,0 
Somalia  62,2  71,0  64,3  61,1  62,5  63,7  46,2  28,7  59,1  66,0  61,0  60,6  60,2  59,9  42,7  23,9 
Sudan  31,5  30,3  31,8  30,6  32,5  34,0  33,3  25,8  23,7  18,8  24,2  28,4  27,5  26,8  23,9  16,3 
Syrian Arab Republic  23,8  24,3  24,7  26,1  25,9  25,8  18,3  9,3  38,5  39,5  39,9  43,7  41,9  40,2  24,6  15,5 
Tunisia  18,8  24,4  19,8  21,6  17,8  15,0  11,1  4,1  28,6  31,1  31,1  41,9  33,8  28,1  10,8  3,0 
United Arab Emirates  15,9  10,4  16,3  23,0  20,4  16,5  4,4  2,8  38,2  24,1  39,0  52,7  47,5  41,4  9,5  1,3 
West Bank and Gaza Strip  9,4  5,1  9,9  12,9  13,6  14,1  8,3  3,0  10,3  5,8  10,9  15,0  14,8  14,6  7,4  2,3 
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TABLE 8: Gender Gap in Economic Activity (per cent) 
 
   1980  2005 
   15+  15-24  15-64  25-34  25-54  35-54  55-64  65+  15+  15-24  15-64  25-34  25-54  35-54  55-64  65+ 
Algeria  56,8  39,4  59,7  74,3  75,0  75,7  58,5  17,5  44,5  36,7  45,5  46,5  50,3  53,4  49,0  20,8 
Bahrain  69,0  46,1  69,4  72,3  79,6  86,8  76,7  46,2  58,3  32,9  58,6  53,8  62,3  67,5  76,2  37,6 
Comoros  22,4  12,3  21,2  28,5  26,3  24,5  32,1  43,7  29,4  19,2  27,8  30,5  32,5  34,4  38,0  58,9 
Djibouti  24,4  17,5  23,8  27,8  27,1  26,4  32,0  31,2  29,9  21,6  29,1  32,2  32,8  33,3  38,3  40,5 
Egypt  56,3  43,1  57,4  61,5  64,0  65,4  76,1  38,0  53,1  23,2  55,3  66,2  72,5  77,1  68,4  16,9 
Iraq  60,5  43,5  61,2  72,8  74,6  76,0  60,4  43,8  57,8  40,6  58,2  66,0  68,9  71,6  58,7  44,9 
Jordan  53,3  29,0  54,7  72,4  75,6  77,7  54,5  29,1  49,7  31,7  50,8  58,4  61,0  63,4  48,2  23,9 
Kuwait  61,4  31,6  62,1  70,0  73,6  77,9  58,5  13,2  36,0  15,1  36,0  27,3  36,3  45,2  54,0  15,8 
Lebanon  48,2  38,1  49,8  47,1  54,6  60,4  70,9  28,4  47,2  39,6  48,2  43,4  50,2  54,5  67,1  36,5 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  63,5  40,1  64,5  74,0  76,3  78,3  73,2  34,2  48,3  39,6  48,9  47,0  52,1  56,8  65,9  38,2 
Mauritania  29,3  20,9  28,6  32,3  32,1  32,1  38,6  41,2  29,6  21,3  28,6  32,0  32,2  32,5  38,3  40,5 
Morocco  58,8  44,8  61,2  68,5  71,5  74,1  72,2  31,3  54,3  41,1  55,1  58,7  61,3  63,3  68,4  34,1 
Oman  62,9  39,3  64,2  73,2  76,7  79,8  65,0  21,8  58,2  36,3  59,1  62,9  66,4  70,3  58,7  26,6 
Qatar  70,8  61,1  70,8  70,4  70,3  70,3  79,4  58,9  52,8  47,0  52,7  49,6  47,6  45,8  76,1  48,1 
Saudi Arabia  67,7  45,1  68,8  81,1  82,8  83,9  60,6  37,0  60,7  39,0  61,9  65,7  69,7  73,5  66,3  31,6 
Somalia  33,2  19,2  31,5  38,2  37,0  36,0  50,6  59,3  35,7  21,8  34,1  38,8  39,3  39,7  53,5  63,4 
Sudan  55,4  41,2  55,4  64,5  64,0  63,6  60,9  54,8  48,2  27,5  48,3  57,4  59,9  62,1  59,1  46,4 
Syrian Arab Republic  55,8  38,6  57,1  70,2  70,5  70,6  65,5  29,3  49,1  36,5  49,3  56,2  57,4  58,5  56,2  38,0 
Tunisia  61,4  46,2  64,1  74,7  78,8  81,8  60,2  28,4  46,4  18,3  47,3  52,1  61,0  67,4  54,7  32,6 
United Arab Emirates  78,6  71,4  78,6  76,2  78,6  82,1  80,5  61,4  53,2  39,0  53,0  46,2  51,6  57,8  83,1  30,9 
West Bank and Gaza Strip  54,0  40,6  56,5  73,3  72,2  71,4  47,3  15,1  56,2  37,9  57,9  71,9  72,2  72,4  50,5  15,8 
Yemen  45,8  38,1  46,7  42,9  52,5  63,2  71,8  18,7  45,7  37,5  46,7  42,1  51,7  60,4  71,2  20,2   50 
TABLE 9: Unemployment Rate (per cent) 
   Men  Women  Year  Source 
Algeria  17.5  18.1  2004  Labor force survey 
Bahrain  9.4  6.7  2001  Population census 
Egypt  6.3  23.9  2002  Labor force survey 
Jordan  12.3  21.1  2000    
Kuwait  1  1.7  2002  Administrative reports 
Lebanon  8.6  7.2  1997    
Morocco  11.5  13  2003  Labor force survey 
Oman  14.2  37  1996    
Qatar  2.3  12.6  2001  Labor force survey 
Saudi Arabia  4.2  11.5  2002  Labor force survey 
Syrian Arab Republic  8.3  24.1  2002  Labor force survey 
Tunisia  13.2  17.1  2004  Labor force survey 
United Arab Emirates  2.2  2.6  2000    
West Bank and Gaza Strip  28  20  2004  Labor force survey 
 
TABLE 10: Urbanization Rate (per cent) 
   1960  2005 
Algeria  30,4  60 
Bahrain  82,3  90,2 
Comoros  10  36,3 
Djibouti  46,6  84,6 
Egypt  37,9  42,3 
Iraq  42,9  66,8 
Jordan  50,9  79,3 
Kuwait  72,3  96,4 
Lebanon  39,6  88 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  22,7  86,9 
Mauritania  5,8  64,3 
Morocco  29,2  58,8 
Occupied Palestinian Territory  44  71,9 
Oman  3,5  78,6 
Qatar  80  92,3 
Saudi Arabia  30,2  88,5 
Somalia  17,3  35,9 
Sudan  10,3  40,8 
Syrian Arab Republic  36,8  50,3 
Tunisia  36  64,4 
United Arab Emirates  72,1  85,5 
Yemen  9,1  26,3 
Arab Countries  30,2  57,1 
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TABLE 11: Urban/rural migration by type of movement, Egypt, 1976–1996 
 
   Census Year  
   1976  1986  1996 
Urban–Urban   2 577 959  3 003 054  2 535 864 
   64,3%  72,9%  60,4% 
Rural–Urban   984 469  540 933  562 471 
   24,6%  13,1%  13,4% 
Urban–Rural  260 295  422 955  949 489 
   6,5%  10,3%  22,6% 
Rural–Rural   186 724  152 296  147 611 
   4,7%  3,7%  3,5% 
Total   4 009 447  4 119 238  4 195 435 
Source: Calculated for the 1976, 1986, and 1996 census data 
              (CAPMAS, 1979, 1989 and 1999)    
 
TABLE 12: Estimated migrant stocks circa 2000 in the Arab region 
Country  Thousands   Proportion of total 
population (%) 
Qatar  409  70.4 
United Arab Emirates  1,922  68.2 
Kuwait  1,108  49.3 
Jordan  1,945  38.6 
Bahrain  254  37.6 
Oman  682  26.1 
Saudi Arabia  5,255  23.7 
Lebanon  634  18.2 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  570  10.9 
Syrian Arab Republic  903  5.5 
Yemen  284  1.4 
Algeria  250  0.8 
Tunisia  38  0.4 
Egypt  169  0.2 
Morocco  26  0.1 
Source: United Nations 2004, , World Population Policies, 
2003, New York: United Nations    
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TABLE 13: Percentage of nationals and expatriates in the population of GCC countries,  
1995-2000 
 
Country  1975  1980  1985  1995  2000  2001-2002 
BAHRAIN     
Nationals  77.1  69.3  63.5  61.8  60.0  60.0 
Expatriates  22.9  30.7  36.5  38.2  40.0  40.0 
Total ('OOOs)  261.6  336.7  434.7  586.1  651.8  690.0 
KUWAIT     
Nationals  30.9  28.5  27.7  36.1  37.4c  37.0 
Expatriates  69.1  71.5  72.3  63.9  62.6  63.0 
Total (`OOOs)  994.9  971.3  1,697.3  1,958.8  2,363.3  2,36 
OMAN     
Nationals  86.9  81.8  81.6  72.7  73.3  74.0 
Expatriates  13.1  18.2  18.4  27.3  22.7  26.0 
Total ('OOOs)  766.0  984.0  1,193.0  2,149.0  2,441.8  2,42 
QATAR     
Nationals  43.1  40.9  47.7  29.6  26.3  28.0 
Expatriates  56.9  59.1  52.3  70.4  73.7  72.0 
Total ('OOOs)  147.7  206.6  241.0  547.0  580.3  585 
SAUDI ARABIA     
Nationals  86.7  75.4  69.3  67.9  74.6  70.0 
Expatriates  13.3  24.6  30.7  32.1  25.4  30.0 
Total ('000s)  7,026.3  9,688.0  12,642.2  19,534.0  20,278.8  23 
UAE    
Nationals  37.0  28.7  36.2  25.1  24.3  20.0 
Expatriates  63.0  71.3  63.8  74.9  75.7  80.0 
Total ('OOOs)  525.1  977.4  1,116.8  2,378.0  2,889.6  23 
All GCC countries    
Nationals  77.4  67.1  63.5  61.4  65.1  61.5 
Expatriates  22.6  32.9  36.5  38.6  34.9  38.5 
Total ('OOOs)  9,721.6  13,550.7  17,325.0  27,152.9  29,321.7  1 32.5 I 
Sources: Girgis, 2002; ESCWA, 2001 (Data for 2000); PACI, 2002       
d) Sources: for Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE: The 2001 annual report by the GCC secretariat, 
released July 27, 2002 as well as The Economist Country Reports from mid-2002; for Saudi Arabia reports by 
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TABLE 14: Unemployment by level of education (per cent) 
 
Country  Year  Sex  Primary  Secondary   Tertiary   Type of source  
Algeria  1991  MF  54,6  25,6  5,8  Household or labor force survey 
   1995  MF  55,6  20,7  15,7    
Bahrain  1997  MF  42,5  43,2  13,1  Employment official records 
   1997  M  52,1  36,9  10,0    
   1997  F  23,3  55,9  19,6    
   2004  MF  32,5  41,1  19,9    
   2004  M  45,0  38,1  9,8    
   2004  F  20,6  44,0  29,5    
Djibouti  1991  MF  8,4  25,0  0,3  Household or labor force survey 
   1991  M  11,3  23,7  0,3    
   1991  F  3,2  27,1  0,5    
Kuwait  1995  MF  49,1  29,4  6,3  Population census 
   1995  M  53,3  26,3  3,9    
   1995  F  29,7  44,9  17,7    
   2002  MF  27,5  39,9  6,1  Administrative reports 
   2002  M  36,6  28,8  2,9    
   2002  F  12,2  58,8  11,4    
Morocco  1990  MF  53,6  21,1  9,6  Household or labor force survey 
   1990  M  58,2  19,1  9,2    
   1990  F  44,4  25,2  10,5    
   2003  MF  50,9  20,6  19,3    
   2003  M  57,6  19,4  14,3    
   2003  F  34,5  23,4  31,4    
Oman  1996  MF  43,7  35,3  4,4  Household or labor force survey 
   1996  M  53,1  21,6  4,0    
   1996  F  19,8  70,0  5,4    
Qatar  1997  MF  24,3  28,8  21,5  Population census 
   1997  M  28,1  26,1  13,0    
   1997  F  16,0  34,6  39,8    
Saudi Arabia  1999  MF  43,9  31,5  15,8  Household or labor force survey 
   1999  M  55,7  27,1  6,9    
   1999  F  13,2  42,9  39,1    
   2002  MF  38,3  34,7  20,1    
   2002  M  52,1  31,6  6,5    
   2002  F  8,2  41,6  49,6    
Syrian Arab Republic  2002  MF  75,2  10,3  9,8  Household or labor force survey 
Tunisia  1989  MF  51,2  25,8  1,3  Population census 
   1989  M  53,4  26,0  1,3    
   1989  F  45,7  25,4  1,5    
   1994  MF  47,7  26,1  1,7    
   1994  M  50,5  26,0  1,4    
   1994  F  39,8  26,6  2,4    
   2003  MF  43,4  37,4  10,0  Household or labor force survey 
United Arab Emirates  1995  MF  40,0  23,0  20,3  Population census 
   1995  M  45,0  20,8  15,2  Household or labor force survey 
   1995  F  12,6  35,5  49,0    
  1996  MF  28,4  14,6  14,9    
  1996  M  30,2  14,1  10,0    
  1996  F  14,3  18,1  53,0    
  2003  MF  57,5  14,5  17,6    
  2003  M  63,0  15,0  10,7  Household or labor force survey 
  2003  F  15,0  10,4  71,5    
Source: KILM 4th Edition, ILO, 200          54 
Table 15: Technical/vocational enrolment in ISCED 3 
 as % of total enrolment in ISCED 3 
 
Country\Year  2003  2004  2005 
Algeria  16.1  19.8  21.3 
Bahrain  49.0  48.5  48.2 
Djibouti  20.4  19.3  18.7 
Egypt  63.9  63.3  57.1 
Jordan  19.6  20.5  17.5 
Kuwait  10.6  11.6  9.0 
Lebanon  26.7  27.0  26.3 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  49.0     
Morocco  12.7  11.7  12.0 
Palestinian Autonomous Territories  4.6  4.5  4.8 
Qatar  2.4  2.0  2.0 
Saudi Arabia  3.5  3.5  3.5 
Sudan  5.3  4.4  2.9 
Syrian Arab Republic  31.4  31.5  28.2 
Tunisia  3.0  5.7  6.4 
United Arab Emirates  1.7  1.6  1.3 
Yemen  1.7  1.6  1.7 
Comoros  0.5  1.2  1.2 
Australia  64.2  62.5  61.8 
Japan  24.7  24.6  24.7 
Belgium  70.2  55.7  55.5 
Denmark  53.3  55.0  54.4 
Finland  58.8  52.4  53.2 
France  56.4  56.2  56.1 
Germany  62.2  61.2  60.3 
Greece  36.0  34.0  36.1 
Iceland  34.0  38.7  38.7 
Italy  26.0  62.8  61.5 
Netherlands  69.1  69.2  68.5 
Norway  59.2  60.5  60.8 
Portugal  28.1  30.2  32.9 
Spain  37.2  38.7  42.6 
Sweden  49.0  57.5  57.7 
Switzerland  65.0  64.8  64.7 
United Kingdom  33.2  38.4  39.2 
Source: UNESCO, http://stats.uis.unesco.org/, consulted 12 June 2007  55 
TABLE 16: Youth unemployment (per cent) 
















Type of source 
Algeria  2004  MF  43,4  3,1  45,6     Household or labor force survey 
   2004  M  42,8  3,2  46,3     Household or labor force survey 
   2004  F  46,3  3,0  42,4     Household or labor force survey 
Egypt  2002  MF  27,1  4,8  57,0  8,1  Household or labor force survey 
   2002  M  21,4  7,6  64,2  8,3  Household or labor force survey 
   2002  F  40,0  2,4  50,3  7,8  Household or labor force survey 
Jordan  2003  MF  30,3  3,7  58,6  8,4  Household or labor force survey 
   2003  M  28,0  3,6  57,9  12,5  Household or labor force survey 
   2003  F  43,2  3,7  59,2  3,8  Household or labor force survey 
Morocco  2003  MF  17,0  1,7  35,9  7,3  Household or labor force survey 
   2003  M  17,4  1,8  37,6  10,8  Household or labor force survey 
   2003  F  15,9  1,3  31,7  3,8  Household or labor force survey 
Qatar  1997  MF  14,6  12,0  52,6  4,9  Population census 
   1997  M  10,6  10,8  52,2  5,5  Population census 
   1997  F  74,7  27,9  53,6  4,0  Population census 
Saudi Arabia  2002  MF        58,7     Household or labor force survey 
   2002  M        60,5     Household or labor force survey 
   2002  F        54,7     Household or labor force survey 
Syrian Arab Republic  2002  MF  26,3  6,7  78,2  13,7  Household or labor force survey 
   2002  M  21,4  9,7  82,1  15,6  Household or labor force survey 
   2002  F  38,9  3,3  73,3  11,7  Household or labor force survey 
United Arab Emirates  2000  MF        47,0     Official estimates 
   2000  M        45,8     Official estimates 
   2000  F        53,5     Official estimates 
West Bank and Gaza Strip  2004  MF  39,8  1,7  33,7  10,2  Household or labor force survey 
   2004  M  38,9  1,6  32,2  16,6  Household or labor force survey 
   2004  F  44,8  3,2  44,1  3,4  Household or labor force survey 
Yemen  1999  MF        48,4     Household or labor force survey 
   1999  M        46,9     Household or labor force survey 
   1999  F        55,8     Household or labor force survey 
Source: KILM 4th Edition, ILO, 2005               56 
TABLE 17: GDP per person employed (1980=100) 
 




Emirates  Yemen 
1980  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1981  98,5  101,4  79,7  100,2  94,8  101,4  98,8  106,1  100,3  102,0 
1982  100,8  109,4  77,0  102,8  101,4  96,7  107,8  104,6  87,3  99,9 
1983  101,8  114,9  68,4  100,3  98,3  81,1  106,6  102,6  78,7  102,0 
1984  103,2  118,8  66,8  104,3  99,9  76,1  98,1  95,1  77,8  102,3 
1985  104,3  123,5  64,0  103,6  103,5  66,9  89,1  97,5  70,1  98,2 
1986  99,6  123,7  61,6  108,3  108,9  59,3  90,3  90,6  53,9  97,1 
1987  95,4  123,8  61,6  106,7  103,9  58,6  90,2  89,9  52,9  97,7 
1988  90,2  126,0  47,3  101,4  111,8  57,2  89,3  98,7  50,1  98,4 
1989  90,2  126,8  42,0  87,1  111,7  56,2  94,3  87,0  52,6  98,1 
1990  85,9  127,0  40,4  83,4  113,3  60,9  85,0  90,8  55,8  94,3 
1991  81,1  125,9  14,4  73,1  118,0  65,4  91,2  97,6  54,1  85,4 
1992  78,8  117,1  17,9  77,7  110,4  66,2  85,3  104,9  52,9  86,8 
1993  73,9  117,2  17,3  75,0  106,6  65,1  88,2  102,6  51,2  89,6 
1994  70,3  118,9  15,8  73,2  114,9  64,8  87,3  105,3  52,3  89,5 
1995  70,2  121,0  13,9  72,8  104,9  64,5  87,1  108,0  51,4  97,5 
1996  70,0  123,3  15,2  71,1  114,9  63,3  89,9  113,6  52,8  102,2 
1997  68,1  126,8  14,1  70,3  109,7  62,9  95,5  114,5  53,7  106,2 
1998  69,0  132,4  15,8  69,4  115,4  62,6  98,3  117,4  50,9  109,1 
1999  68,7  136,5  16,7  68,5  112,7  60,2  102,0  108,9  49,6  110,3 
2000  67,8  139,8  18,1  68,3  111,2  61,1  106,6  105,3  52,0  112,4 
2001  67,0  140,2  19,1  68,9  115,3  59,3  110,1  105,1  50,1  114,0 
2002  67,2  140,2  19,9  69,6  116,2  57,3  113,6  105,4  47,4  114,9 
2003  69,1  140,2  15,1  69,4  119,4  59,2  117,0  104,2  47,2  114,9 
Source: KILM 4th Edition, ILO, 2005 
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TABLE 17’: GDP per person employed (1980=100) 
 
   Canada  France  Indonesia  Israel  Italy  Japan 
Republic 





1980  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1981  100,2  101,5  93,2  102,5  100,6  102,3  103,6  102,3  103,4  101,4  101,4 
1982  100,2  103,8  91,8  101,9  100,8  104,4  108,7  104,5  107,5  105,0  100,3 
1983  102,3  105,1  95,5  103,0  101,7  105,1  120,2  107,2  110,3  109,5  103,2 
1984  105,5  107,5  98,2  102,1  104,3  108,5  131,3  112,7  114,9  109,9  106,3 
1985  108,1  109,4  96,8  103,2  106,3  112,5  134,8  110,3  118,7  112,4  108,2 
1986  107,7  111,4  93,7  105,9  108,5  114,9  145,2  110,1  124,7  116,6  109,5 
1987  108,9  113,8  95,4  111,2  111,6  118,5  153,6  110,6  132,5  119,7  110,4 
1988  110,9  117,7  97,9  111,0  114,7  123,7  165,6  116,6  135,6  121,6  112,6 
1989  111,1  120,7  105,4  109,5  117,2  127,2  169,3  123,3  133,7  121,1  114,1 
1990  110,6  122,5  111,1  112,6  117,9  131,1  180,0  129,1  143,5  121,0  114,7 
1991  110,0  123,5  120,1  112,6  117,3  132,9  190,7  137,2  139,2  122,6  115,4 
1992  112,0  126,0  125,4  115,3  118,8  132,8  197,2  145,0  146,2  125,8  118,3 
1993  114,1  126,6  133,3  115,5  120,8  132,9  205,6  152,9  166,2  129,9  119,5 
1994  117,1  129,0  138,4  121,1  125,3  134,3  215,7  162,5  145,3  132,9  121,4 
1995  118,3  129,9  153,4  124,5  129,1  136,8  228,4  177,5  151,3  136,7  122,5 
1996  119,1  130,8  154,6  126,5  129,7  140,8  239,3  177,7  157,3  139,2  125,2 
1997  121,4  132,5  162,4  126,7  131,8  141,9  246,1  186,9  169,1  141,2  127,8 
1998  123,3  134,4  137,4  127,3  132,8  141,2  243,9  172,5  169,7  144,0  131,0 
1999  126,9  136,0  136,7  126,2  133,5  142,4  262,4  178,2  159,7  146,2  134,6 
2000  130,3  137,3  141,8  131,6  135,0  146,8  273,1  184,4  175,2  150,0  137,5 
2001  130,9  137,7  145,2  126,6  134,7  148,3  278,1  183,3  162,5  152,2  138,4 
2002  132,2  138,6  149,1  122,5  132,8  149,7  289,4  187,1  176,8  153,7  141,4 
2003  131,8  139,5  156,7  121,0  131,7  151,9  298,8  190,3  188,8  155,6  145,0 
            Source: KILM 4th Edition, ILO, 2005 
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Table 18.  The Coefficient on Years of Schooling. Mincerian Rate of Return, Latest Year 
Country  Year  Mean years 
of schooling 
Coefficient 
(percent)  Source 
              
Argentina  1989  9.1  10.
3 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Australia  1989  ..  8.0  Cohn and Addison (1998) 
Austria  1993  ..  7.2  Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (1999) 
Bolivia  1993  ..  10.
7 
Patrinos (1995) 
Botswana  1979  3.3  19.
1 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Brazil  1989  5.3  14.
7 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Burkina Faso  1980  ..  9.6  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Canada  1989  ..  8.9  Cohn (1997) 
Chile  1989  8.5  12.
0 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
China  1993  ..  12.
2 
Hossain (1997) 
Colombia  1989  8.2  14.
0 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Costa Rica  1991  ..  8.5  Funkhouser (1996) 
Cote d'Ivoire  1986  6.9  20.
1 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Cyprus  1994  ..  5.2  Menon (1995) 
Denmark  1990  ..  4.5  Christensen and Westergard-Nielsen (1999) 
Dominican Rep.  1989  8.8  9.4  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Ecuador  1987  9.6  11.
8 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Egypt  1997  ..  5.2  Lambropoulos and Karadjia (1999) 
El Salvador  1992  ..  7.6  Funkhouser (1996) 
Estonia  1994  10.9  5.4  Kroncke (1999) 
Ethiopia  1972  6.0  8.0  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Finland  1993  ..  8.2  Asplund (1999) 
France  1977  6.2  10.
0 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Germany  1988  ..  7.7  Cohn and Addison (1998) 
Ghana  1995  9.7  7.1  Jones (2001) 
Greece  1993  ..  7.6  Magoula and Psacharopoulos (1999) 
Guatemala  1989  4.3  14.
9 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Honduras  1991  ..  9.3  Funkhouser (1996) 
Hong Kong  1981  9.1  6.1  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Hungary  1987  11.3  4.3  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
India  1995  ..  10.
6 
Kingdon (1998) 
Indonesia  1995  8.0  7.0  Duflo (2000) 
Iran  1975  ..  11.
6 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Israel  1979  11.2  6.4  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Italy  1987  ..  2.7  Brunello, Comi and Lucifora (1999) 
Jamaica  1989  7.2  28. Psacharopoulos (1994)   59 
Country  Year  Mean years 
of schooling 
Coefficient 
(percent)  Source 
8 
Japan  1988  ..  13.
2 
Cohn and Addison (1998) 
Kenya  1986  8.0  16.
0 
Dabalen (1998) 
Korea  1986  8.0  13.
5 
Ryoo, Nam and Carnoy (1993) 
Kuwait  1983  8.9  4.5  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Malaysia  1979  15.8  9.4  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Mexico  1992  ..  7.6  Psacharopoulos et al. (1996) 
Morocco  1970  2.9  15.
8 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Nepal  1999  3.9  9.7  Parajuli (1999) 
Netherlands  1994  ..  6.4  Hartog, Odink and Smits (1999)  
Nicaragua  1996  ..  12.
1 
Belli and Ayadi (1998) 
Norway  1995  ..  5.5  Barth and Roed (1999) 
Pakistan  1991  ..  15.
4 
Katsis, Mattson and Psacharopoulos (1998) 
Panama  1990  9.2  13.
7 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Paraguay  1990  9.1  11.
5 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Peru  1990  10.1  8.1  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Philippines  1998  8.8  12.
6 
Schady (2000) 
Poland  1995-96  ..  7.0  Nesterova and Sabirianova (1998) 
Portugal  1991  ..  8.6  Cohn and Addison (1998) 
Puerto Rico  1989  ..  15.
1 
Griffin and Cox Edwards (1993) 
Russian Federation  1996  11.7  7.2  Nesterova and Sabirianova (1998) 
Singapore  1998  9.5  13.
1 
Sakellariou (2001) 
South Africa  1994  7.1  4.1  Dabalen (1998) 
Spain  1991  ..  7.2  Mora (1999) 
Sri Lanka  1981  4.5  7.0  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Sudan  1989  10.2  9.3  Cohen and House (1994) 
Sweden  1991  ..  5.0  Cohn and Addison (1998) 
Switzerland  1991  ..  7.5  Weber and Wolter (1999) 
Taiwan  1972  9.0  6.0  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Tanzania  1980  ..  11.
9 
Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Thailand  1989  ..  11.
5 
Patrinos (1995) 
Tunisia  1980  4.8  8.0  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
United Kingdom  1987  11.8  6.8  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
United States  1991-95  ..  10.
0 
Rouse (1999) 
Uruguay  1989  9.0  9.7  Psacharopoulos (1994) 
Venezuela  1992  ..  9.4  Psacharopoulos and Mattson (1998) 
Vietnam  1992  7.9  4.8  Moock, Patrinos and Venkataraman (1998)   60 
Country  Year  Mean years 
of schooling 
Coefficient 
(percent)  Source 
Yugoslavia  1986  ..  4.8  Bevc (1993) 
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TABLE 19: Agricultural labor among workers (%) 
  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Algeria  25,4     24,4     24,1     23,8     23,6     23,3     23,0    
Bahrain  1,5     0,9     0,9     0,9     0,9     0,9     0,8    
Djibouti  80,4     78,5     78,1     77,9     77,4     77,0     76,5    
Egypt  37,0     33,6     32,9     32,2     31,5     30,8     30,2    
Iraq  12,8     10,1     9,6     9,2     8,7     8,3     7,9    
Jordan  13,0     11,4     11,1     10,7     10,4     10,1     9,8    
Kuwait  1,8     1,6     1,6     1,6     1,6     1,8     1,9    
Lebanon  5,2     3,7     3,5     3,2     3,1     2,9     2,7    
Libya  8,1     6,0     5,6     5,3     4,9     4,6     4,3    
Mauritania  54,1     52,9     52,7     52,4     52,1     51,9     51,7    
Morocco  40,2     36,1     35,3     34,6     33,8     33,1     32,4    
Oman  41,2     36,9     36,1     35,2     34,3     33,5     32,6    
Qatar  1,7     1,2     1,2     1,2     1,2     1,2     1,2    
Saudi Arabia  13,9     6,1     6,0     4,7     7,9     9,5     11,2    
Sudan  65,4     61,1     60,2     59,3     58,3     57,4     56,6    
Syria  30,5     28,0     27,5     27,1     26,6     26,2     25,7    
Tunisia  26,5     24,6     24,2     23,9     23,5     23,1     22,8    
United Arab Emirates  6,2     4,9     4,7     4,4     4,2     4,0     3,8    
Yemen  55,3     50,4     49,4     48,4     47,4     46,4     45,4    
Arab Countries   33,6     31,6     31,0     30,4     29,5     29,0     28,6    
Source: Unified Arab Economic Report, 2006 
 
TABLE 20: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Algeria  10,5  8,9  10,4  10,0  10,5  10,2  8,5 
Comoros  40,9  48,6  50,0  50,2  50,5  50,9  51,0 
Djibouti  3,2  3,5  3,5  3,6  3,6  3,6  3,7 
Egypt  16,8  16,7  16,6  16,5  16,7  15,2  14,9 
Iraq  ..  5,4  8,1  9,0  8,6  ..  .. 
Jordan  4,3  2,3  2,3  2,5  2,8  2,8  2,8 
Kuwait  0,4  0,4  0,4  0,5  0,5  ..  .. 
Lebanon  7,3  7,3  6,8  6,8  6,6  6,5  6,5 
Mauritania  37,4  27,6  27,0  25,8  27,5  25,6  23,7 
Morocco  14,6  13,8  15,6  16,1  16,7  15,9  14,1 
Oman  2,8  2,0  2,1  2,1  2,0  1,9  .. 
Saudi Arabia  5,9  4,9  5,2  5,1  4,5  4,0  .. 
Sudan  32,4  41,8  42,9  41,6  39,3  35,4  33,7 
Syria  31,6  23,8  27,0  26,8  26,7  24,8  23,3 
Tunisia  11,4  12,3  11,6  10,3  12,1  12,7  11,6 
United Arab Emirates  2,9  3,5  3,5  3,4  2,9  2,6  2,3 
Yemen  20,0  10,3  11,5  11,1  14,3  13,8  13,3 
Source: WDI, 2006 
 
 
   62 
 
TABLE 21: Alternative Scenarios for Labor Force Absorption  
Scenario 
Growth rate of  
Investment/GDP  Implied Growth 
of GDP  L  K  A 
a=0.5  a=0.6  a=0.7  a=0.5  a=0.6  a=0.7 
1  3,50%  8,5%  7,7%  7,1%  -0,50%  40,5%  38,0%  36,2%  5,5% 
2  3,50%  7,5%  6,8%  6,4%  0,00%  37,5%  35,5%  34,1%  5,5% 
3  3,50%  6,5%  6,0%  5,6%  0,50%  34,5%  33,0%  31,9%  5,5% 
4  3,50%  3,5%  3,5%  3,5%  2,00%  25,5%  25,5%  25,5%  5,5% 
5  4,00%  9,0%  8,2%  7,6%  -0,50%  42,0%  39,5%  37,7%  6,0% 
6  4,00%  8,0%  7,3%  6,9%  0,00%  39,0%  37,0%  35,6%  6,0% 
7  4,00%  7,0%  6,5%  6,1%  0,50%  36,0%  34,5%  33,4%  6,0% 
8  4,0%  4,0%  4,0%  2,00%  27,0%  27,0%  27,0%  4,0%  6,0% 
 
TABLE 22: Expenditures on Active and Passive Labor Market Programs in Selected MENA 
Countries, 2003 
 
Source: Razmara (2005), "Labor Markets Worldwide: Key Trends and Policy Issues", available on internet at 
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206981/presentation%20employment%20programs%20setareh.pdf 
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